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QUALITY TRAINING AND LEARNING IN
AVIATION: PROBLEMS OF ALIGNMENT
Phillip J. Moore, Tai Po, New Territories, Hong Kong
Henry R. Lehrer, Rossford, Ohio,
and
Ross A. Telfer, Newcastle, Australia
ABSTRACT
The challenge of producing training programs that lead to quality learning outcomes is ever
present in aviation, especially when economic and regulatory pressures are brought into the
equation. Previous research by Telfer & Moore (1997) indicates the importance of
appropriate alignment of beliefs about learning across all levels of an organization from the
managerial level, through the instructor/check and training level, to the pilots and other crew.
This paper argues for a central focus on approaches to learning and training that encourage
understanding, problem solving and application. Recent research in the area is emphasized as
are methods and techniques for enhancing deeper learning.
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INTRODUCTION
The bean counters will never give us the money to train properly….
How can we provide check and training if we aren’t given the funds we need?
Management will not approve the extra hours we need for training….
Why doesn’t our management realize that to train properly we need appropriate funding?
Training is the key to an efficient airline: why won’t the accountants recognize this?
Sound familiar? The tension between training departments and
budgetary control in aviation management is a perennial issue. Reduced to
its elements, the conflict is one of quality versus quantity, or effectiveness
versus efficiency. A solution argued in this paper is that present approaches
to training contribute to the tension and are part of the problem. The
common solution to a training problem is to provide more training:
unfortunately, it is usually more of the same. The ab initio pilot who flies
more and more circuits in order to gain expertise in flaring the aircraft in
landing will eventually make it: but at what cost?
The cost extends way beyond the dollars. Think of the soul-destroying
repetition for the instructor, the reputation of the training establishment, the
self-concept of the trainee, the changing attitude towards further training,
and the loss of motivation. The overall cost is massive. Now let is us extend
this cost structure into an airline, and consider it over an extended period.
Training is more than big bucks: it is big costs.
One way of reducing the training costs is to work on the quality of
training: which means improving the quality of a trainee’s learning. Our
recent research, part of an ongoing international study by Moore, Telfer and
Smith (1994), Telfer and Moore (1997) and Lehrer, Moore and Telfer
(1998), provides insight into how this can be achieved.
BACKGROUND
Our research is concerned with the motives and strategies that learners,
instructors, and managers have for learning. As Telfer (1994) notes, the
outcomes of training are very much determined by the motivation and
strategies of the individual pilot or student, by the instructor or check and
training captain’s values, skills and knowledge (especially about learning
and instruction), and by the nature of the organization or system in which
the training occurs. Central to our work are questions such as: Is learning
just remembering and being able to repeat the information without
understanding? Is learning a sense of challenge? Is learning something that
increases anxiety? Is learning about doing well? What do instructors know
about learning? Do they see learning in a manner similar to that of their
trainees? What do training managers think of learning and instruction?
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Before moving to examine these questions in more detail, there is merit
in placing the instructional cycle into a context and Biggs and Moore’s
(1993) 3P Model of Learning provides a useful framework. Their 3Ps refer
to Presage, Process and Product factors as they relate to learning. Presage
factors are the baggage that pilots, students, instructors and the
organization bring to learning. For pilots and students these include age,
experience, abilities, personality, and their preferred way of learning. For
instructors, their Presage factors include age, experiences, motivations,
personalities and their beliefs and views about learning. Organization
factors such as the training syllabus, provision of resources and facilities,
scheduling, supervision, and the effects of regulatory authorities are part of
Presage as well. (We will return to these organizational factors in the
concluding section of the paper.)
The second P in the 3P model is Process, the actual processes that occur
when a pilot or trainee, and instructor, engage in a particular task or set of
tasks. Clearly, the above Presage factors influence how that occurs. The
pilot’s baggage for learning interacts with that of the instructor and the
organization.
The final P is Product, the outcomes of learning. Can the trainee now do
what is expected? Can they pass the test? What type of test is it? Typically,
outcomes are measured quantitatively (She got 78 percent or he rated at
4/5) and presumably the higher the rating or score the more has been
learned or the better the overall performance. Qualitative assessment also is
used when judgements are made about the quality of the learning outcome
(This response shows a good level of integration and understanding with
application to novel problems.) However, it is well recognized that the
Product component of the model has the potential to wag both Presage and
Process parts of the model. If, for example, the tests are of low level details
and facts, then it is likely that after repeated experiences of such tests both
trainees and instructors will focus their learning on such details, perhaps to
the detriment of understanding and application. So, the 3P Model
represents a convenient way of examining learning and instruction, from
the perspective of what is brought to the learning situation, what occurs in
the learning, and what is assessed. It may be stating the obvious, but if each
of these is out of synchrony, then potential problems will arise. Now, to
return to the questions posed at the beginning of this section.
For aviation the posing of such questions, and their answers, are
important for a number of reasons. Firstly, there is a substantial body of
literature that demonstrates the effects of learner approaches to learning on
subsequent learning outcomes (Biggs, 1999, 1987; Biggs & Moore, 1993).
Individuals who are Surface in orientation (Biggs, 1999, 1987) are
primarily motivated to do the least amount of work possible to get through a
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course, are sometimes anxious about their learning (and possible failure),
and rely extensively upon rote learning or learning things by-heart (without
understanding) to pass a test or training program. Individuals who are Deep
in orientation are quite different to those who are Surface, because they
tend to see learning as a challenge, as something which gives enjoyment
through mastering what has to be learned and they employ a range of
strategies that ensure that understanding emerges (e.g., taking own notes,
summarizing, discussing with others). Biggs (1987) identifies a third
approach to learning, the Achieving approach. This approach is
characterized by a desire to do well, compete and be organized for learning.
Of course, there may be circumstances in which each of these approaches is
appropriate but for the most part, understanding should be a priority. (It is
very difficult to argue against understanding in aviation when you think of
the ways in which the crew handled the well-documented Sioux City
accident.)
From typical school, college, and university studies, there is evidence
that Surface approaches to learning tend to be harmful and that Deep and
Achieving approaches are more beneficial to learning (e.g., Biggs, 1987;
Cantwell & Moore, 1998; Drew & Watkins, 1998). Moore and Telfer
(1990) replicated these findings in ab initio aviation settings. Indeed, they
showed that those who were deeper in their approaches to learning, went
solo earlier than those trainees who were not so oriented. Work with
experienced pilots by Moore, Telfer and Smith (1994) and Monfries and
Moore (1998) illustrates a general propensity of Deep and Achieving in
captains and first officers, with Deep scores being higher. Surface
approaches to learning were ranked low by experienced pilots but there
were differences between pilots from different airlines suggesting both
corporate and national cultural effects.
Secondly, there is evidence that students and pilots are influenced by the
beliefs of those who instruct them. In school settings, for example, Tang
(1993) demonstrated that teacher knowledge influenced students’
approaches to learning (they were Deeper with experts) and Richardson,
Andes, Tidwell and Lloyd (1991) showed a positive link between teachers’
classroom practices and their beliefs about learning. In aviation, Henley’s
(1995) work amply shows that beliefs about learning influence how
instruction is conducted, how feedback is provided, how expectations are
established and so on. Her findings are important because, as Biggs (1999)
indicates, student approaches to learning are essentially reactions to the
teaching/instructional environment.
Thirdly, there is evidence that organizational factors influence learning.
It is not difficult to think of examples where the organization makes (or
breaks) quality learning. At the simplest level, the allocation of appropriate
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resources (say a high fidelity simulator) can influence the quality and
effectiveness of learning, as can the time devoted to training. Similarly,
there needs to be a corporate sense of commitment to high quality training,
compared to just minimally meeting the regulatory requirements (Maurino,
1997). Bent and Fry (1997) reinforce the critical role of appropriate
resource investment by the organization when new aircraft are introduced
into the fleet.
Fourthly, there is potential problem of lack of congruence or poor
alignment across the three levels of student/pilot, instructor, and
organization. What if the expectations of the instructors are different from
those of the organization? What if the objectives are on understanding but
testing is on unrelated facts? What if the pilots are motivated to understand
but their instructors focus on surface level matters? Conflicts of perceptions
and expectations in learning are not conducive to quality learning (Cohen,
1987). The next section of this paper examines one of these issues
specifically, a comparison between pilots and instructors’ views on
learning, their approaches to learning and instruction.
PILOT AND INSTRUCTOR APPROACHES
We were concerned about the possibilities of different perspectives on
learning being taken by pilots and instructors. Do they align or not was the
basic question, and a subsidiary question was if they were, were they
appropriate in terms of quality learning. We used the constructs of Deep,
Surface and Achieving developed by Biggs (1987) and in order to make
some comparisons between pilot and instructor beliefs about learning, we
compared pilot data previously reported by us (Moore, Telfer & Smith,
1994; Moore, 1995) with some data we gathered from instructors more
recently (For initial analyses see Lehrer, Moore & Telfer, 1998).
Firstly, though, a quick look at the pilot data. Three hundred forty-six
experienced pilots from five different international carriers and one U.S.
institute completed the Pilot Learning Processes Questionnaire (PLPQ), a
30 item six point Likert scaled instrument which identifies Deep, Surface
and Achieving approaches to learning. (See Moore, Telfer and Smith
(1994) for validity and reliability of the scales.) In general terms, the results
showed that pilots had a greater propensity to report Deep approaches to
learning (mean scale score of 4.63 on the 1 to 6 scale), than Surface (mean
scale score of 2.74) while Achieving perspectives (mean scale score of
3.93) were somewhat in between. The standard deviations for the three
scales were in the range 0.42 to 0.59 indicating a reasonable distribution of
scores around the means. Not unexpectedly in any analysis of individual
differences, there were individuals who scored well above the mean on
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individual scales as there were individuals who scored well below the mean
for the various scales. In other words, a number of different profiles could
be generated from the data with some pilots showing a higher propensity
for Surface learning and lower Deep scores and so on.
The data from instructors were gathered from the Pilot Instruction
Processes Questionnaire (PIPQ) which we developed (Moore, Lehrer &
Telfer, 1997), again using the constructs of Deep, Surface, and Achieving
and six point Likert-type items. With responses from over 220 instructors in
the U.S., we were able to establish factorial validity for a 15-item version
(three factors of Deep, Surface and Achieving) with reliabilities acceptable
for a developing scale. Typical items from the revised questionnaire
include: “Opportunities are provided to ensure that students really
understand what they are being taught” (Deep); “I try to promote an
expectation that those I instruct just need to pass” (Surface); and
“Competition brings out the best in students” (Achieving). For the
instructors, the mean scale score (range 1 to 6) was highest for Deep (4.95
with standard deviation of 0.56), then Achieving (3.70 with standard
deviation of 0.61), and lowest mean scale scores for Surface (3.31, standard
deviation of 0.69). However, as in the pilot sample, there were differences
amongst individuals. For example, for Deep the highest individual scale
score was 6.0, the lowest 2.40, the person with a mean of 6 clearly saw
learning as being for understanding and instruction should be designed to
accommodate that approach. For Surface the corresponding extremes were
5.60 and 1.00. An instructor with high scores like the 5.60 above, shows a
strong emphasis towards a minimalistic approach of telling students what is
to be learned and passing the test. So, in this sample there were individual
instructors whose views and beliefs about instruction and learning were
markedly different with others. Some reported instruction as being about
developing pilots’ understanding while others’ perceptions were centered
on just passing the examinations, and “how to do” not the “how and why.”
COMPARISONS OF PILOTS AND INSTRUCTORS
Direct comparisons can be made between our pilot group and our
instructor group on approaches to learning and instruction, although any
interpretation needs to be tempered by the fact that the data were gathered
from two different groups, that is the instructors were not those who
instructed the pilots. (We anticipate conducting a study where the
individuals all come from the one organization.)
The general profile across the three sub scales of Deep, Surface, and
Achieving shows a similar trend for both pilots and instructors with the
highest mean scale scores being for Deep (4.63 pilots, 4.95 instructors), the
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lowest for Surface (2.74 pilots, 3.31 instructors) with Achieving in between
(3.93 pilots, 3.70 instructors). The largest mean difference is between pilots
and instructors on the Surface scale with almost a standard deviation
difference suggesting that of the three scales, the Surface one differentiates
the two groups most. Instructors seem more concerned than pilots about
just passing examinations.
As indicated above, however, there were substantial differences in the
profiles of individuals in both the pilot and instructor groups. Several
hypothetical examples will help show the potential problems that can arise
if there is a lack of appropriate alignment between those who instruct and
those who are instructed. There are individuals in our data sets who reflect
these profiles.
Pilot A has a profile on the PLPQ of high Deep (mean = 5.70), low
Surface (mean = 1.90) and high Achieving (mean = 4.90). Here is a pilot
who is very motivated to understand, to be competent and master the
materials or tasks to be learned, and wants to do well against other pilots in
the course. This pilot has a range of strategies for comprehensive learning
while also recognizing there may be a role for Surface learning, but it is not
the predominant approach. The predominant approach is Deep/Achieving
(Understanding and doing well.).
Pilot B’s PLPQ profile shows highest scores for Surface (mean = 4.90),
and low scores for both Deep and Achieving (respective means = 2.80 and
2.20). Here is a pilot who is concerned about examinations (anxious), is
only willing to do what is required to just get through and not the slightest
bit more, and uses rote learning to have the material ready to regurgitate at
the test. Pilot B is not so keen to succeed but does recognize to some extent
that learning has to do with understanding. However, the dominant feature
of the profile is the high Surface approach.
Instructor A’s PIPQ profile shows high Deep scores (mean = 5.60), low
Surface scores (mean = 1.80) and high Achieving scores (mean = 4.70).
Here is an instructor who is keen on pilots gaining understanding through
discussion, supplementary materials, and encouragement to study and do
independent work. This instructor is not interested in having pilots just pass
the test but encourages them to excel, seek perfection, and interact with
others. This is a Deep/Achieving oriented instructor.
Instructor B has a PIPQ profile of low Deep (mean = 2.40), moderate
Achieving (mean = 3.20) and high Surface (mean = 5.50). This instructor
focuses on telling pilots what they need to do to pass the test and only
instructs them to do so, nothing more. Little attention is given to
understanding and learning for application in other situations. Instructor B
is a Surface oriented instructor.
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Now consider the consequences of these pilots and instructors working
together. Take Pilot A and Instructor A. Clearly their approaches to
learning are aligned in that they both are concerned with quality
understandings, mastery, competence and overall, doing well against
others. It is likely that the outcomes would be quality learning and greater
motivation to continue learning due to the intrinsic rewards emerging from
satisfaction with learning (and instructing). However, if we take Pilot B and
Instructor B, we see that there is alignment (both are Surface oriented) but it
is an alignment that the literature indicates will not produce quality
outcomes, it is inappropriate. The focus for both will be on doing the
minimal amount to pass the tests and while this may be important in itself,
there is less likelihood that the learning will be enduring. (You may recall
the experience of learning something only to pass a test and then having
forgotten it almost immediately after the test was taken.)
The mixed profiles pose other problems due to the tensions of
mismatches. What if Instructor B instructs Pilot A? The literature suggests
that in this situation it is not likely the instructor will change (Henley,
1995). Pilot A may have to suffer the Surface approach of the instructor and
in additional time do those Deep things to keep understanding in the
foreground. It is conceivable, however, that if type B instructors
consistently instruct pilots like Pilot A, these pilots may revert to Surface
level strategies to survive the courses. [Recall our earlier reference to
Biggs’ (1999) comment that student approaches are reflective of the
instructional environment.] Clearly such a reversion would be an
undesirable state of affairs. What of the match between Pilot B and
Instructor A? Again there is a mismatch but the literature is helpful here as
it shows that an individual’s approach to learning can be changed for the
positive through instructional strategies reflective of the Deep and
Achieving approaches (e.g., Moore, 1991). Some of the examples we give
in the discussion below help show how deeper approaches can be
encouraged by an instructor. What is apparent from these examples is that
congruence at the high Deep/Achieving end is likely to produce better
quality learning outcomes, problem solving abilities, and greater
satisfaction (for pilot and instructor).
DISCUSSION
The lack of appropriate congruence between the approaches of
instructors and trainees to training in aviation has major implications for
key players: not only the check and training staff, and the pilots being
trained, but the management of the organization needing to find the
additional funds for over-hours training, and those executives who strive to
establish a reputation for a well-managed operation.
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Aviation management needs to develop the same acuity and sensitivity
that leads an experienced pilot to automatically adjust out-of-sync engines.
Understanding, professional judgement and long experience have provided
a blueprint of the feel and sound of balanced power. As soon as a lack of
synchronization occurs, there is an automatic reaction to correct it.
Aviation organizations need to develop the same homeostatic response to
differential values in the training department. Trainees and instructors have
to be a collaborative team in order to achieved high quality training. Deep
and Achieving are the aim points.
Why is such congruency vital? Because aviation organizations are
working with adults as trainees, and adults learn in ways which are quite
different from those which work with children at school. Many of the key
approaches to adult education (or andragogy) cannot be achieved if the
instructor lacks a deep and achieving approach or, worse, has only a surface
approach (our Instructor B). There are three major training problems which
result: dislocated objectives; an emphasis on instruction rather than
learning; and an application of pedagogy (child learning) rather than
andragogy.
Dislocated Objectives
In order to evaluate training in a reliable and valid way, it is necessary to
consider the extent to which training objectives are attained. In other words,
training departments look to see if there is any gap between what they say
they are providing in training, and what trainees actually achieve. The only
way to do this is to express objectives in terms of what the trainee has to
know and do. These so-called performance objectives have to be based in
learner terms. Something like: “At the end of this sortie, the trainee will be
able to…”. What we often see in organizations with a surface approach to
training is the objectives expressed in terms of what the instructor will do:
“Teach duties of pilot-flying…” The key difference is that between
instructing and learning. Without learning, there has been no training.
Without learning, there will be a need for overflying the training syllabus.
Instruction rather than Learning:
Efficient learning occurs when we are taught what we do not already
know. This implies a recognition that adults have different levels of
experience and knowledge, which skilled instructors identify through
questioning and other forms of testing (eg. Schiewe & Moore, 1997; Telfer,
1994). It costs training dollars when a standard course is presented
regardless of trainees’ existing experiences and knowledge. A side effect is
that the examples presented in either the training manuals or the instructor’s
Moore, Lehrer, and Telfer 11
presentation will not relate to the trainees’ world. Rapport is diminished.
The flow-on effects include a reduced likelihood of trainee questions, less
awareness of trainee reactions, and an artificially-enhanced view of trainee
feedback. This relates, too, to the way in which the overall training program
is to be evaluated. To consider this we go to the final consideration: adult
learning and its implications for training.
Andragogy, not Pedagogy
Adults are undertaking training to improve their skills and knowledge in
application to their job. They need to know why they are learning
something, where it applies, and how they expect it to improve their on-the-
job performance. They are not simply completing exercises and sorties,
exams, subject, tests and topics. Ticking the boxes is a poor substitute for
real training. See the link with Deep and Achieving?
It follows that adult training is problem-based not subject-based. How
does a surface-oriented training program present it?
This is what you need to know for the test.
It is in the manual…
It is on the video.
Watch the slides and complete the questions.
You need to get 80 percent on the multiple-choice test.
Questions from the instructor will tend to be closed and convergent:
What is the speed for.....?
How many miles out.....?
Quality learning has a crucial place for additional open and divergent
questions:
Why does........?
What would happen if....?
Consider this case study then tell me what you would do and why....?
In summary, instructors and trainees need to:
1. Speak the same language (figuratively as well as literally);
2. Start from where the trainee is;
3. Use the trainee’s experiences, past and present;
4. Use questioning as a key activity;
5. Look at the big picture of training, examples from line activities,
and applications on the job.
These activities can only occur when the training and testing program,
instructors and trainees are in sync.
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As noted above, challenges for management also arise from the notions
of alignment and congruence. As Telfer (1997) notes, for effective training
the dynamics of the organization have to be considered. Managers have
control over factors such as resources, personnel, the syllabus, standards,
licensing and testing. Their beliefs about learning will undoubtedly impact
on each of these factors, where appropriate, and if manager beliefs are
different from those of the instructors and pilots, there will be tensions that
may reduce instructional and learning effectiveness. If management, for
example, views learning of Crew Resource Management (CRM) as
something to be done merely to satisfy a regulatory authority, then their
commitment is likely to be more of a Surface orientation, the minimal
amount of time and resources being made available for both instructors and
pilots, cabin crew, maintenance crew etc. Under such conditions, it is not
likely that quality instruction and learning will occur. Indeed, we would
argue that managers need to be reflective about their beliefs about learning
so that organizations can then consider appropriate alignment across all
three levels, pilots, instructors and organization. Telfer and Moore (1997)
indicate ways in which management can investigate its approaches to
learning using the Deep, Surface, and Achieving constructs which have
been a consistent theme of this paper.
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UNEQUAL BARGAINING? AUSTRALIA’S
AVIATION TRADE RELATIONS WITH THE
UNITED STATES
Russell Solomon
Wellington, New Zealand
ABSTRACT
International aviation trade bargaining is distinguished by its use of a formal process of
bilateral bargaining based on the reciprocal exchange of rights by states. Australia-United
States aviation trade relations are currently without rancour, but this has not always been the
case and in the late 1980s and early 1990s, their formal bilateral aviation negotiations were a
forum for a bitter conflict between two competing international aviation policies. In seeking
to explain the bilateral aviation outcomes between Australia and the United States and how
Australia has sought to improve upon these, analytical frameworks derived from
international political economy were considered, along with the bilateral bargaining process
itself. The paper adopts a modified neorealist model and concludes that to understand how
Australia has sought to improve upon these aviation outcomes, neorealist assumptions that
relative power capabilities determine outcomes must be qualified by reference to the formal
bilateral bargaining process. In particular, Australia’s use of this process and its application
of certain bargaining tactics within that process remain critical to understanding bilateral
outcomes.
For Australia, its economic relations with the United States have been
important for almost all of this century, though rarely considered by
commentators as important as the security relations. Of these economic
relations, Australia’s bilateral trade relations have dealt more with
merchandise trade than services trade between the two countries though the
potential, if not current importance, of Australia-U.S. services trade is
beginning to be recognised.1 See Table 1 for a review of the quantity of
service exports and total exports in the 1990s.
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Australia’s trade relations with the U.S. have not been without their
frustrations and U.S. protectionist policies in a number of trade sectors,
most notably agriculture, have prompted strident comments by Australia’s
political leaders. Such comments have not, however, translated across into
efforts by Australia to link these trade problems to other aspects of the
overall political-economic or even strategic relationship.2 The rhetorical
flourishes against U.S. policies during the 1990s by Australian ministers
from both sides of politics, as well as from prominent industry actors,
should not blur the fact that Australia’s approach to the U.S. on trade, as on
other economic matters, has been generally conservative and predictable.3
Concern at U.S. treatment of Australia’s trade interests has been tempered
by regard to the U.S.’s uniquely important security role with the current
Howard government deliberately enhancing the security aspects of the
relationship. The importance given to the security dimension of the
relationship together with the disavowal of issue linkage reveals an
acknowledgement by Australian policy-makers of the overall weakness in
Australia’s bargaining power in relation to the U.S.
Against this background, it is all the more surprising that Australia has
periodically sought to modify the structural weakness in its aviation trade
relations with the U.S. and improve its bilateral trading outcomes. Central
to understanding how Australia has sought to improve these sectoral
outcomes is an appreciation of the bargaining process through which the
two countries have formally traded their aviation rights.4 With aviation
services trade effectively excluded from the Uruguay Round settlement, the
bilateral aviation trade negotiations between Australia and the U.S. remain
a more important focus than the multilateral approach taken by each
country.
Recent years have seen changes in Australia’s approach with efforts
made to reform the sector while the U.S. has pursued a policy of promoting
greater reform of international aviation through the negotiation of liberal
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Table 1. Australia’s Services Exports as a Proportion of Total Exports
(Balance of Payments Basis AUD$m at Current 1997 Prices)
Services Exports Total Exports
(Goods & Services)
1990 14,102 66,257
1991 15,085 69,959
1992 16,374 76,396
1993 18,539 82,361
1994 19,935 86,381
1995 22,416 96,600
Source: Yearbook Australia, 1997
bilateral agreements. Despite global changes made in the direction of trade
liberalisation, international civil aviation still retains overtones of state-
based mercantilism with the balance of trading rights between countries
still determined by a process of bilateral bargaining based on reciprocity
rather than comparative advantage.
ARGUMENT IN BRIEF
In order to explain aviation trade outcomes between Australia and the
U.S., reference can be made to the neorealist/neoliberal debate. In
particular, neorealism and liberal institutionalism are presented as possible
frameworks to explain aviation trade outcomes. The neorealist approach
privileges the power-capable resources of states and argues that bilateral
outcomes between asymmetrically powerful states will be determined by
which state has greater resources.5 Liberal institutionalism, on the other
hand, argues that in explaining outcomes, account must be taken of the
influence of international institutions or regimes.6 These institutional
arrangements are able to explain the complexity of interdependence;
provide the means by which states co-operate with each other; and act to
constrain the behaviour of the stronger state and assist the weaker state in
securing favourable results. Another related approach, that of modified
structural realism,7 argues that the co-operation developed by such
arrangements comes to be seen as beneficial for states as they pursue their
own interests.
This paper presents a modified neorealist explanatory model. This
model posits that while neorealism offers the greater insights into
Australia-U.S. aviation bargaining outcomes, the formalised bilateral
bargaining process transmutes as well as transmits power-capable
resources and should be seen as seriously qualifying the assumptions
derived from the asymmetry of power relations. While power relations
remain important in explaining outcomes, the formalised bilateral
bargaining process provides the opportunity for the influence of non-
power, or cognitive factors, notably the ideas and perceptions of policy-
makers and negotiators. The intervention of this bargaining process relaxes
the neorealist assumptions by allowing the weaker state to take advantage
of the mutual need for a deal and apply these non-power resources towards
an improvement in its outcomes.
Applying this model, the paper contends that the formal bilateral
bargaining process, with its emphasis upon deal-making, has allowed
weaker states to apply bilateral tactics to extract concessions from stronger
states.8 In its aviation trade bargaining with the U.S., Australia has made
use of three bargaining tactics which have served to improve its outcomes,
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albeit each to a limited extent. These have been the withholding of
agreement; the assertion of control over important aspects of the
negotiations; and the demonstrating of commitment and determination.
NEOREALISM
A neorealist analysis argues that patterns of behaviour between states
can be best understood as being derived from the structure of the
international system with the state considered a rational actor motivated to
apply its own power-capable resources to advance its own self-interest.9 As
related to the bilateral relations between asymmetrically powerful states,
this approach argues that the strong would prevail over the weak as
measured by their respective power-capable resources. Domestic factors
and non-power considerations are not considered relevant in helping to
explain state behaviour. States are concerned more about relative gains and
advantage than about absolute gains in their relations with other states and
behave accordingly.10 How much power a state has in relation to its
bargaining partners will determine how likely it will be able to satisfy both
its demands and its national interests.
The neorealist analysis is useful in helping to explain the asymmetrical
bargaining context-the distribution of power capabilities favouring the
U.S.11 over Australia-within which these two states trade their aviation
rights. However, neorealists seek to explain bargaining outcomes rather
than simply the context within which such bargaining occurs. Such an
explanation requires that we must be able to show that the relative power
capabilities of the stronger state will consistently translate across into
favourable bargaining outcomes. This translation of power into favourable
outcomes depends, in turn, on the extent to which issues or sectors can be
linked. In other words, power fungibility must exist in the sense that the
asymmetry of power in one issue or sector can be found, in like measure, in
another issue or sector.
As an explanation of Australia-U.S. aviation trade outcomes, neorealism
should be able to show that their bilateral bargaining outcomes are
determined more by Australia’s position within the global political
economy, and its relative power-capabilities vis-à-vis the U.S., than by its
own actions or bargaining tactics. While the structural relationship may fall
short of providing a complete explanation, there are certainly important
external sources of influence upon Australia. Officials, for instance, will be
influenced by the opportunities and constraints which confront the
Australian economy as it engages with the global economy, while industry
actors will be affected by the international market as they trade globally.
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LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND MODIFIED
STRUCTURAL REALISM
Liberal institutionalism is an international level approach arguing that
conventions and expectations (institutions) can be as important as power-
capable resources in understanding the relations between states. For the
liberal institutionalists,12 these institutions or regimes13 assist in explaining
the complexity of interdependence which exists between states and serve as
manifestations of the co-operation which states are capable of exhibiting
towards each other for common ends.
Regimes are seen as accounting for the regularity of state behaviour14
and in not necessarily acting in response to the demands of the major
trading states15; and may indeed act to constrain the self-seeking behaviour
of major states and operate as mechanisms to structure states’ preferences.
The ability of such institutional arrangements to constrain state behaviour
is enhanced the longer these regimes remain in existence and, over time,
they can reveal an important normative dimension.
A modified structural realist approach16 argues further that co-operation
is not only possible but necessary and that patterns of co-operation, once
established, tend to persist and come to influence state behaviour. However,
while regimes may well act as intervening variables and take on a ‘life of
their own’, it should not be assumed that they necessarily constrain self-
interested state behaviour and prevent stronger states from securing
favourable outcomes. To test the explanatory power of regimes, political
scientist Baldev Raj Nayar has suggested three qualifications to the
hypothesis that regimes are necessary.17 The first of these is that the norms
of the regime ought to be genuinely ‘interdependence norms’ and not
simply reflect the international system of states in which the influence of
the powerful prevails.18 Secondly, a regime must be shown to be a
constraint on self-interested state behaviour; and thirdly, the regime must
be shown to continue in existence despite changes in the balance of power
or in national interests, particularly with respect to powerful states.
Therefore, if we take these reservations into account, we are more
concerned with a regime’s outcomes to assess whether its norms, which
may ostensibly encourage interdependence (thereby constraining self-
interested state behaviour), do in fact perform that role. The General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) has arguably had a moderating effect upon the
conduct of bilateral relations in the trading of goods and some services.
However, these international institutions, with their advocacy of
multilateral liberalisation, have continued to be excluded from considering
the important economic issues relating to the conduct of aviation trade. In
fact, trade in international air services reverses the usual means by which
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the GATT/WTO has liberalised trade in goods with air services being
‘prohibited unless specifically allowed’ by the various ‘freedoms of the air’
in the Air Services Agreements (ASAs).19 Importantly, where the trade in
goods and other services are conducted on the basis of the principle of
comparative advantage, trade in air services occurs in the expectation of
reciprocal benefits being granted between states.
There are two important international organizations that deal with
international aviation matters. They are the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), a United Nations agency with a membership of
nearly two hundred states, with major safety responsibilities;20 and the
International Air Transport Association (IATA), a trade association which
undertakes tariff-setting, policing of the industry, and facilitates the
necessary financial transfers among airlines.21 While useful and relevant in
terms of their technical and other functional services, these organizations
have been of limited and declining importance in terms of the trading of
economic rights.22
Bearing in mind Nayar’s three qualifications on the relevance of
regimes, the above organizations do not present themselves as good
candidates for explaining aviation trade relations by means of a liberal
institutionalist or modified structural realist approach. With the continued
importance of the bilateral ASAs, and their formalisation of the notion of
reciprocity, the multilateral negotiation of economic rights and
responsibilities promoted by the GATT/WTO has not had, and is unlikely
to have, much impact in this issue area. While the GATT’s Uruguay Round
settlement has included a General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
which applies to a number of air transport services,23 GATS’ important
Annex of Transport Services excluded the application of the multilateral
agreement to the trading of traffic rights.
The five-year review of the operation of the Annex undoubtedly
encourages those who argue that the WTO and its “generalized principles
of conduct”24 such as multilateralism and non-discrimination will, in time,
replace the bilateral regulation of air transport services.25 This is, however,
highly questionable given that the U.S. and other major aviation powers
have used the bilateral means of ‘open skies’ agreements to pursue their
own policies of international aviation liberalisation since the 1970s. As to
whether international institutions could act to weaken the structural power
of strong states such as the U.S., it is sobering to remember that such
institutions have been useful vehicles for powerful states to further their
own particular interests. These may have been either for the support of
protectionist instruments or towards the liberalisation of trade. There would
seem little reason to believe that their application to international air
transport services would be any different.26
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THE BILATERAL BARGAINING PROCESS
The Chicago Convention of 194427 failed to come to terms with the
fundamental economic issues involved in international civil aviation due to
the diametrically opposed positions of the two major participants, the U.S.
and the UK. Thus, the bilateral system of regulation established before the
Second World War prevailed and was able to develop independently of any
multilateral framework. Apart from the first two ‘freedoms of the air’28, the
trading of aviation rights has continued to be regulated by means of state-
negotiated bilateral air service agreements (ASAs).29 This bilateral
bargaining process has served to perpetuate the principle of state
sovereignty and generally acted to protect the economic position of
‘national carriers.’30 In essence, these bilaterals will regulate entry usually
by identifying the number of carriers, routes and kinds of traffic allowed
with such resultant bilateral agreements being usually based on the
mercantilist concept of reciprocity. In other words, each bilateral partner
has a critical role in determining the size of the total supply of the bilateral
market and not just the level of its own output.
The form of trade regulation that this lattice of bilateral accords
represents is essentially discriminatory in nature and acts contrary to the
multilateral principles of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) and National
Treatment and has kept international air transport removed from the
GATT/WTO’s liberalization developments.31 This does not mean that this
bargaining approach cannot facilitate (perhaps even encourage)
increasingly liberal economic regulatory arrangements, as evidenced by the
series of ‘open skies’ bilaterals32 which the U.S. and others have used as
instruments to advance liberalisation.
Both contextual (or systemic) factors and issue-specific capabilities
influence the formal bilateral bargaining process that regulates aviation
trade.33 The process has the potential to translate as well as transmit power-
capable resources towards certain specific outcomes with the issue or
sectorally-specific resources at each state’s disposal being brought to the
negotiations and offering opportunities to a weaker state to apply tactics to
gain against a stronger partner.34 For instance, it may be that in the process
of making a deal, the weaker state will be able to show a determination to
gain a certain result (even if that means making other sacrifices) which
could force the stronger state to accede so as to reach an overall agreement.
As an intervening variable which may serve to prevent the direct
transmission of power-capable resources into sectoral outcomes, the
bargaining process has three important features: that both parties realise
that there are gains to be made from the agreement; that mutual action is
required for an agreement; and that there exists more than one possible
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agreement.35 Taken together, these place two asymmetrically powerful
states in a more comparable (if not equal) relationship to each other while
providing opportunities for the application of issue-specific resources and
the use of tactics towards favourable outcomes. Importantly, the process
provides a mechanism through which a weaker state can avoid focusing its
bilateral bargaining directly upon the policy process of the stronger state,
thus making it more difficult for the latter to apply its structural power
towards a desired result. Instead, both parties are required to undertake a
formal process towards a jointly agreed result.
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND TO
AUSTRALIA-U.S. AVIATION BARGAINING
Australia-U.S. aviation trade relations over the postwar period has
always been conducted against a background of U.S. dominance in the
international aviation market and with the Australian government and its
negotiators keeping close attention to the economic welfare of its
international carrier, Qantas. For its part, Qantas was expected to pursue
commercial objectives that were compatible with national ones.
As with most aviation bilateral negotiations, the major issues in
contention between the U.S. and Australia were the levels of capacity on
the specified contested routes—the South Pacific and North Pacific routes
(see Table 2)—and the extent of access to each other’s domestic market.
While market access disputes have been decided to the U.S.’ advantage due
to its large domestic passenger market, disputes in Australia-U.S.
bargaining over route capacity have been resolved through the negotiation
process.
Each country has changed its approach to negotiating aviation rights
with the other, as a result of variations in its own international aviation
policy. Since the Second World War, the U.S. has consistently called for a
more liberal, less regulatory regime and this was further promoted after its
own 1978 domestic deregulation.36 Concerned that this ideas-driven policy
was not delivering satisfactory results for U.S. commercial aviation
interests, the Reagan administration implemented a ‘trading rights’ policy
that effectively meant the U.S. would no longer seek to promote global
deregulation through bilateral negotiations. Rather the U.S. became more
interested in promoting liberalization by trading access to the lucrative U.S.
domestic market in return for greater liberalization from its negotiating
partners.37 Thus, liberalization came to be used as part of a mercantilist
approach to advance U.S. carrier interests as well as more generally
furthering global liberalization.
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With little to be gained in terms of market access in Australia, the U.S.
has not sought to offer Australia its more liberal ‘open skies’ agreement,
though these agreements do, in fact, reveal similar restrictions to those
faced by Australian negotiators.38 The U.S. pro-competitive ‘trading rights’
negotiating policy, as applied to its bargaining with Australia, has been
export-oriented. The focus of the U.S.’s bargaining approach has been upon
improving U.S. market share on international routes and this was pursued
vigorously in its negotiations with Australia in 1988 and 1993.39
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Table 2. Capacity Negotiated and Utilised Under Australia’s ASAs with the U.S.
(International Air Passenger Transport, as of February 1, 1998)
Capacity (per week) – South Pacific route
Australia United States
Entitlement: Market driven Market driven
Utilised: 28 x B747 (10,020 seats
excluding seats leased to
American, British,
Canadian airlines)
21 x B747 & 519
codeshare seats
Unutilised: New carrier may
commence operations at
any time with up to 4
services – (conditions
apply)
As for Aust.
Capacity (per week) — North Pacific route
Australia United States
Entitlement: 3 frequencies with any
aircraft type; maximum
of 2 carriers
As for Aust.
Utilised: Nil Nil
Unutilised: 3 frequencies with any
aircraft type; maximum
of 2 carriers
As for Aust.
Capacity (per week) — Guam route
Australia United States
Entitlement: 4 DC10 As for Aust.
Utilised: Nil Nil
Unutilised: 4 DC10 (conditions
apply)
As for Aust.
Source: Productivity Commission, Draft Report on International Air Services, June 1998.
The changes in U.S. policy represent a curious mixture of ideas and
interests and reveal a somewhat ambiguous approach to the formal process
of bilateral bargaining. On the one hand, the U.S. has been concerned that
such negotiations have constituted an impediment or trade barrier to both
the liberalization and expansion of international aviation services. On the
other, it has recognized the gains made by U.S. carriers from these
negotiations and the valuable role they have performed in advancing the
liberalization of international aviation. Given its economic strength, the
U.S. prefers to negotiate agreements bilaterally on most trade issues despite
its rhetoric in support of the periodic multilateral negotiations. Evidence of
this preference in the aviation sector can be found in the U.S.’s lukewarm
approach to the inclusion of aviation services within the Uruguay Round
settlement of the GATT.40
Until the late 1980s, Australian policy was based on the singular
designation of Qantas as the international carrier; the separation of
international and domestic aviation sectors; and the government ownership
of airlines in both the domestic and international sectors. In negotiating
with the U.S., Australia had adopted a pre-deterministic approach to the
setting of capacity that was restrictive and highly regulatory and designed
to keep U.S. demands for capacity increases in check. Australia was
resistant to any increase in U.S. access to the Australian market without
equivalent U.S. market access for Qantas.
Negotiating with the U.S., with its dominant market position and
promotion of aviation liberalisation, had always constituted a form of
pressure upon Australia for a change in policy. However, when the policy
changes did come in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was for domestic
economic reasons rather than as the result of external influences. The
Hawke and Keating governments’ policy changes were a direct response to
a perceived need to bring the aviation sector into the mainstream of national
economic policy-making and make aviation policy-making subject to the
same impulses as most other sectors.41 In 1989, the government changed its
negotiating policy to become a “…more hard-headed economic
approach…and fuller analysis of where to capture the economic and other
benefits for Australia…[and]…what is in it for Australia as a whole will be
the dominant consideration”.42 Importantly, this represented the beginning
of a new approach aiming for a ‘balance of overall benefits’, an approach
which was more accommodating of the pressure for liberalisation coming
from the U.S. and elsewhere. (For a summary of points or gateways
available, see Tables 3 and 4).
This change was followed with a more substantial policy change in 1992
when the then Prime Minister Paul Keating announced, as part of a general
economic statement,43 a program of accelerated reform of the Australian
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Table 3. Points Available to Australia and the United States on the South Pacific
Route as Negotiated in ASAs
(International Air Passenger Transport, as at February 1, 1998)
Australia
Australia via New Zealand, New Caledonia, Fiji, American Samoa, Canton Island, French
Polynesia, Mexico, Canada to the gataeway points of Honolulu, San Francisco, Los Angeles,
New York and three points to be selected by the government of Australia and to an additional
eight points (which may be changed from time to time) in the U.S. only via one or more of the
specified and/or selected gateway points and beyond to Canada, Mexico, the UK, and Europe
and beyond.
United States
a) United States (excluding Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands)
via Canton Island, French Polynesia, Fiji, New Caledonia and New Zealand to Sydney,
Melbourne, Darwin, Perth, Brisbane, Cairns and another point to be selected by the
Government of the U.S. and beyond to New Zealand, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa,
Europe (including the UK) and beyond.
b) An additional eight points in Australia may be served only via any one or more of the
specified and/or selected gateway points in Australia set forth in sub-paragraph (a). These
eight one-stop points may be changed at any time.
Source: Productivity Commission, Draft Report on International Air Services, June 1998.
Table 4. Points Available to Australia and the United States on the North acific and
Guam Routes as Negotiated in ASAs
(International Air Passenger Transport, as at February 1, 1998)
Australia
Australia via any two points in Asia (including Hong Kong, Japan, Korea and Taipei and may
be changed from time to time) to any three points in the United States to be chosen from
Honolulu, Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York and one other point selected by the
Government of Australia.
Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands:
Australia to Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and beyond to any
two points to be chosen from Tokyo, Nagoya, Fukuoka, Seoul, Taipei, Beijing, and one
additional point to be specified (the beyond points may be changed from time to time).
United States
United States (excluding Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands) via
Canada, Japan, Southeast Asia including the Republic of the Philippines to any two points in
Australia chosen from Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Cairns.
Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands:
Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands to any two points to be chosen
from Sydney, Melbourne, Perth, Darwin, Brisbane, Cairns or a point to be selected by the
Government of the U.S.
Source: Productivity Commission, Draft Report on International Air Services, June 1998.
aviation industry.44 These reforms also signalled the government’s gradual
withdrawal from the exercise of direct control in international aviation
policy-making. An International Air Services Commission (IASC) was
created to determine the allocation of international aviation capacity and
route entitlements among Australia’s airlines. However, despite this
deregulation, the Australian government’s direct involvement in the
determination of aviation outcomes has been guaranteed by its continuing
dominance in bilateral negotiations. For instance, the Commission’s ability
to allocate capacity and route entitlements remains dependent upon the
outcome of government-to-government bilateral negotiations.45
Whether or not the changes have been sufficient to meet the
government’s objectives remains in doubt while it is difficult to gauge the
economic effect of those changes that have been implemented, despite the
growth in Australian international air traffic over the 1990s.46 With
Australia’s unilateral move to increase capacity and to provide for multiple
designation, its negotiating approach became one of taking a broader
economic view. This view took note of the needs of all interests, including
those in the tourist industry, the regions, industry and business, consumer
groups, as well as the Australian carriers. This new policy aimed to
‘balance overall benefits’ rather than remain strictly based upon bilateral
reciprocity. While generally more liberal, it reflected the dual, and often
conflicting, aims of the government: to protect Qantas’ position and its
potential to earn export revenue while also promoting new Australasian
entrants into the market.47
Australia’s approach to dealing with the U.S. changed accordingly and
from the early 1990s, as evidenced by their 1993 negotiations over the
North Pacific route,48 Australia sought to negotiate enhanced route and
capacity entitlements ahead of demand. The move towards deregulation
(though less so than in the U.S.) and greater liberalisation has meant the
Australian government has refashioned its role as being independent of any
Australian carriers-no longer are Qantas’ interests to be paramount. Despite
the policy changes, Australia continues to see the bilateral negotiation of
aviation rights as extremely important: it is both the avenue through which
international liberalisation will occur; and the means by which it can
advance its carriers’ interests in any such liberalisation.
AUSTRALIA’S AVIATION BARGAINING WITH THE U.S.
In contrast to other bilateral trade sectors (notably agricultural trade),
much of the heat has gone out of the aviation bargaining between Australia
and the U.S. This has been because capacity has been liberalised and,
importantly, because no U.S. carrier appears interested in pursuing
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entrance or expansion into the Pacific routes to Australia. This has not
always been the case and as recent as the late 1980s and early 1990s,
difficulties between the two parties had to be resolved by means of the
bilateral bargaining process.49 The determination of capacity has
traditionally been at the heart of Australia’s ASAs.50 Along with
Australia’s concern over route entitlements and access to gateways in its
bargaining partner’s country, Australia saw the tight regulation of capacity
entitlements as a means of containing the liberalising advances of strong
aviation countries such as the U.S. What caused Australia to accede to
automatic capacity increases in its negotiations with the U.S. was the belief
amongst senior ministers and officials, that liberalisation together with the
restructuring and deregulation of the aviation industry, would enhance its
commercial returns.51 Yet, the move towards liberalisation was not without
mercantilist or regulatory overtones and the Australia-U.S. ASAs have
continued to constrain unilateral capacity increases while disallowing
cabotage rights.
While Australia’s liberalizing impulses have served to accommodate
most of U.S. carrier demands from the mid-1990s onwards, the more
interesting story is how Australia used the bargaining process to apply
certain tactics to address the U.S.’s structural power in this sector. It is not
claimed that these tactics are peculiar to this sector but that the formal
aviation bargaining process made their application possible. The first of
these tactics has been Australia’s preparedness to walk away from an
agreement. Australia applied this tactic in 1987 when it terminated the then
existing bilateral memorandum. Australia correctly saw the U.S. to be just
as keen as Australia to reach an acceptable agreement and just as likely to
incur costs (notwithstanding the possibility of gains) from the inability of
the parties to reach an agreement.52
Even if an agreement with Australia failed to be completely satisfactory,
the U.S. would see some value in it for high costs would attach to the
alternative no-agreement result. An agreement would serve to regulate the
aviation rights between the two countries plus holds value for the U.S. in
being a potential (if not an immediately realisable) vehicle for increased
liberalisation of international aviation. The regulatory nature of this
bilateral bargaining process is also useful to the U.S. in providing stability
while conforming with its preference to negotiate bilaterally rather than
multilaterally. Of related importance is the recognition by both parties of
the iterative nature of the negotiating process. With or without an
agreement, both the U.S. and Australia know that they will need to deal
again with each other in order to trade aviation rights and that reaching a
satisfactory agreement can significantly reduce future conflict in this
sector.
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Another tactic applied by Australia in its aviation trade bargaining with
the U.S. has been the assertion of a level of control over the nature of the
negotiations and their subsequent agreement. The joint need for an
agreement places the two states in a more equal bargaining relationship and
provides opportunities for the weaker state to project its own agenda and
interests. Each player has mixed motives (a mutually agreeable result while
advancing the position of its carriers) while both have common and
competing interests (aviation liberalization but also a greater share of
traffic rights). In such a relationship, there is some room for a weaker party
to ensure that its interests are taken into account in the final settlement.53
Australia achieved this in its negotiations with the U.S. in the late 1980s
and early 1990s through being able to maintain a regulatory approach to the
determining of capacity, despite the U.S.’s desire to achieve an open-ended
capacity agreement.54
For Australia, another bargaining tactic has been a preparedness to show
determination or commitment in its bargaining, especially if it desired the
inclusion of provisions objected to by the Americans. A committed
approach to its bilateral bargaining has been used to help overcome
Australia’s relative economic weakness. While changes in Australia’s
negotiating policy have been towards providing greater liberalisation of the
airways, its negotiators have indicated to the U.S. that any expansion of
capacity is likely to be unacceptable if it means that Qantas or another
Australasian carrier will have a reduced market share. However, in the 1993
Northwest airlines dispute, the Australian government showed
ambivalence in its attempts to control capacity so as to maintain Qantas’
market share on the North Pacific route. In acquiescing to increased
capacity by Northwest Airlines, it appeared to have ‘painted itself into a
corner’ as it agreed to remove capacity limits.55
In its negotiations with the U.S., Australia had also sought to trade, as far
as possible, U.S. access to the Australian aviation market for greater access
to the U.S. market. The enduring effectiveness of this strategy has been
questioned with one senior Qantas official seeing it significantly reduced
by the mid-1990s, with Australia having virtually opened up the whole of
its aviation market to U.S. carriers. U.S. access to the Australian aviation
market may have been traded away to either assist in the liberalisation of
Australia’s aviation market; promote other economic interests such as
inbound tourism or; simply to reciprocate for increased access to the U.S.
market. Regardless of causation, there remain few existing concessions that
Australia could now make for increased benefits from its bargaining with
the U.S.
The 1992 U.S. Open Skies policy,56 promoting liberal ASAs as it does,
is more restrictive than others (such as that of New Zealand). It neither
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grants cabotage to foreign carriers nor gives foreign carriers the right to
increase their ownership of U.S. carriers beyond a maximum of 25 percent
of airline voting stock. The pursuit of these more liberal ‘open skies’
arrangements, particularly since 1995, has resulted in the U.S. signing over
30 such agreements with countries from around the globe.57 Until very
recently, the U.S. did not consider that Australia embraced liberalisation to
the same extent and had not sought to sign such an agreement with it.
In mid 1999, the Australian government, in seeking to balance the costs
and benefits of the bilateral negotiating system while promoting
liberalisation, responded positively to the recommendation of its
Productivity Commission that Australia should seek to “negotiate
reciprocal open skies agreements with like minded countries.”58
Importantly, Australia gave itself an escape clause by stating that such
agreements would only be made if they were in the ‘national interest’. In
effect, Australia was announcing that it would seek its own restrictive
version of ‘open skies’ agreements which, like that of the U.S., do not grant
cabotage to foreign carriers (except New Zealand) and limit foreign
ownership of Australia’s international carriers.59
Against this background and that of subtle U.S. pressure provided
through the negotiation of other ‘open skies’ agreements, it should come as
little surprise to learn that Australia and the U.S. entered into an open skies
agreement on cargo in late 1999.60 This agreement removes restrictions on
all-cargo air services between and beyond the two countries but, more
importantly, the talks included an undertaking by both parties that they
would meet again early the following year to discuss removing all
restrictions on passenger services between the two countries.61 Agreement
has yet to be reached. With ‘unlimited’ capacity agreements now covering
Australia-U.S. aviation trade in the important Pacific routes and less
demand by U.S. carriers for those route entitlements, the principal
restriction on U.S. access to Australia, being the carrying of passengers on
Australian domestic routes, may well be the focus of imminent talks.
However, as a 1999 government decision indicates, restriction may still be
the order of the day as this remains an area where Australian carriers,
Ansett Australia and Qantas, continue to exercise influence.62 The overall
result is that while bilateral negotiations no longer contain the previous
rancour, they offer little hope of Australia seeing much, if any, progress, in
terms of market access to the U.S. The time looks ripe for Australia to
consider whether an ‘open skies’ agreement with the U.S. may provide the
improved access that is otherwise unavailable.
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS
This paper has sought to apply a modified neorealist analytical model
which has called for the neorealist explanation of Australia-U.S. aviation
relations to be qualified by an understanding of the dynamics of the
bilateral bargaining relationship. In so doing, the paper sets out to show
how Australia attempted to modify the structural weakness in its aviation
trade relations with the U.S. so as to improve its economic outcomes.
Neorealism is considered more useful than liberal institutionalism in
explaining Australia-U.S. aviation trade outcomes with relative power-
capabilities proving a good indicator of likely results while also explaining
the international context within which Australia-U.S. bargaining is
conducted. Liberal institutionalism, manifested by international regimes,
have, on the other hand, had little impact in determining the nature of these
trade relations, as evidenced by the exemption of aviation from the
Uruguay Round settlement of the GATT/WTO.
Where the neorealist explanation is found wanting is in explaining this
particular sectoral relationship and the dynamics of the bilateral bargaining
upon which the trading of rights depends. In contrast to other trading
sectors, Australia and the U.S. have stood in not only a more competitive
but also a more equal bargaining relationship. Each has sought increases in
capacity and improvements in route entitlements while bargaining access
to its own domestic market. This has meant that the bargaining process,
mainly though not exclusively conducted through formal bilateral
negotiations, has been capable of taking on a dynamic of its own, largely
independent of the respective power-capable positions of the states. As
such, the bargaining process may provide opportunities for a weaker state
to exploit towards an improvement in outcomes.
In seeking to exploit such opportunities, Australia sought to apply
certain tactics through the bilateral bargaining process: the withholding of
agreement; the assertion of control over important aspects of the
negotiations; and the demonstration of commitment and determination.
The effectiveness of Australia’s prosecution of these tactics has also been
influenced by cognitive factors such as ideas and the perceptions and belief
systems of policy-makers and negotiators. Australia’s adoption of a more
liberal approach in the 1990s has acted, importantly, as a form of self-
denial from the application of a restrictive capacity mechanism. On the
other hand, Australian negotiators’ perceptions of the U.S.’s need for an
agreement (or perhaps the cost of not reaching an agreement) in the late
1980s, enabled Australia to retain an element of control over the conduct of
the negotiations during this period. As with Australia, the bilateral
bargaining process requires that the U.S. bargains (possibly even making
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concessions) and does not simply rely upon the application of its greater
power-capable resources to secure desired outcomes.
Encouraged by U.S. carriers, the U.S. government has used the
regulatory nature of the bilateral bargaining process to both maximise the
benefits to U.S. carriers while also promoting the liberalisation of global
aviation. The major exception to this liberalising policy has, of course, been
access to the U.S. market. The export competitiveness of U.S. carriers has
been emphasised with the U.S. domestic market used as a lever to gain U.S.
carriers’ access to other markets. For Australia, it has made liberalising
concessions so as to gain favourable access to the U.S. market. Gaining
such access has proved, however, to be increasingly difficult given that
Australia has little left to concede which the U.S. either wants or needs.U.S.
liberalising moves have become more acceptable to Australia as the 1990s
progressed. This has been largely due to Australian policy changes that
sought to position Australia so as to derive greater returns from its
international aviation activities. International developments (including
domestic U.S. deregulation and liberalisation as well as a new U.S.
international negotiating policy) have been influential. However, domestic
influences have been more important with the government seeing the
removal of the protection traditionally given to Qantas as part of a more
assertive policy to promote travel, trade and tourism: a policy shift
consistent with its broader economic reform agenda. This new policy
framework is not without its problems for the Australian government as it
seeks to reconcile the desire to maximise export revenue received from
increased travel and tourism to Australia while ensuring Australasian
carriers maintain, if not increase, their market shares.
The liberalisation of the international aviation market obviously offers a
mixed picture for relatively weak traders such as Australia. The U.S. has
most certainly used liberalisation to serve nationalistic and mercantilist
ends. Australia too has come to view aviation liberalisation as a means of
providing a boost to its balance of payments. In respect of its aviation
relations with the U.S., Australia has been keen to promote a translation of
ideas of free trade and liberalisation across into a policy of liberalisation of
the U.S. domestic market. However, it has remained concerned that global
liberalisation of aviation may allow those with a comparative advantage in
international aviation to dominate the marketplace. Australia’s pursuit of a
more liberal policy has resulted in virtually unlimited capacity for U.S.
carriers on Pacific routes. Yet, the recent withholding of cabotage from
U.S. carriers (and others) reveals continuing shades of mercantilism in
Australian policy and ongoing concerns about the complete liberalisation
of the Australian aviation market.
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Recent developments have shown Australia unable to use the bilateral
negotiating process to successfully check the pressures of U.S. carriers on
Pacific routes or gain greater access to the U.S. market. This helps to
explain why Australia is now beginning to consider the possibility of an
‘open skies’ agreement with the U.S. on passenger traffic. However, in
focusing upon episodes of tension in Australia-U.S. aviation relations, this
study has shown how Australia, as the weaker state, has been able to apply
specific tactics towards modifying results that would otherwise have
favoured the U.S. Even in the possible future context of an ‘open skies’
negotiation, the provision of the above opportunities for the weaker state
means that formal bilateral talks remain the best possibility for Australia to
seek to improve upon those outcomes normally expected from such a case
of unequal bargaining.
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ABSTRACT
The study of human factors has had a decisive impact on the aviation industry. However, the
entire aviation system often is not considered in researching, training, and evaluating human
factors issues especially with regard to safety. In both conceptual and practical terms, we
argue for the proactive management of human error from both an individual and
organizational systems perspective. The results of a multidisciplinary research project
incorporating survey data from professional pilots and maintenance technicians and an
exploratory study integrating students from relevant disciplines are reported. Survey findings
suggest that latent safety errors may occur during the maintenance discrepancy reporting
process because pilots and maintenance technicians do not effectively interact with one
another. The importance of interdepartmental or cross-disciplinary training for decreasing
these errors and increasing safety is discussed as a primary implication.
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In the current aviation environment there is a strong emphasis on human
factors issues in the improvement of aviation safety (Harle, 1994). Too
often, however, this emphasis has not encompassed the entire aviation
system in researching, training, and evaluating human factors practices.
Traditionally, the study of aviation human factors has focused on
understanding the mechanisms of individual human error so that measures
to minimize the possibility of error could be devised. More recently, an
alternative approach has been proposed that emphasizes the proactive
management of human error from an organizational systems perspective
(Maurino, Reason, Johnston, & Lee, 1995). Graham and Kuenzi (1997)
also suggest a systems approach of combining methods to analyze human
error. In addition to a reduction in risk of future errors, another positive by-
product of this approach is increased communication between the various
departments or career fields of the company (e.g., maintenance, flights
operations, in-flight, and ground operations). This article argues for the
adoption of a systems perspective in both conceptual and practical terms. It
begins with a review of traditional human factors literature and discusses a
contemporary shift toward systems thinking about error management. This
viewpoint became the foundation for a multidisciplinary research project
that addressed maintenance discrepancy reporting and incorporated survey
data from pilots and maintenance technicians representing five industry
segments and an exploratory study integrating students from relevant
disciplines. Although somewhat limited by sample size and survey design,
the implications of this study recommend interdepartmental training as a
way to decrease errors and increase safety in the aviation system.
TRADITIONAL HUMAN FACTORS RESEARCH
Historically, the study of human factors and the application of related
research findings have not encompassed the entire aviation system (Federal
Aviation Administration, 2000). The goal of traditional human factors
research has been to minimize human error in order to maximize system
performance (Proctor & Van Zandt, 1994). Consequently, early research
was based upon the popular, although incomplete, notion that aircraft
accidents were attributable to individual pilot error thus affixing blame by
inferring that human fallibility promoted poor decision making (Hawkins,
1987). While this seemed to appease public sensibilities (and bolster media
sales), little was accomplished to evaluate root causes of mishaps or find
ways of improving the system. In the early years of accident investigation,
there was a tendency to cite blame primarily with the pilot (or air traffic
controller) who was directly involved in the accident (Hawkins, 1987,
p. 31; National Transportation Safety Board, 1987). The emphasis on pilot
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tasks overshadowed consideration of more mundane, lower-profile tasks
such as airplane maintenance and passenger service. By narrowly focusing
human factors research, training, and practice on the highest profile
members of the intricate aviation system, the important interconnections of
other key members and groups were virtually ignored.
SHIFT FROM INDIVIDUAL TO
ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE
More recently, however, accident investigation has expanded its
approach to consider the organization more broadly including the events
leading up to the accident. In other words, what organizational factors (i.e.,
latent errors) led the individual to perform in such a way that his or her
actions led to an accident (i.e., active error)? A major challenge to accident
investigators is the analysis of factors that may have caused a chain of
events reverberating all the way through the organization to the individual.
Thus, a theoretical framework of error management must be general
enough to encompass the organizational system and yet specific enough to
be applicable to past and future accidents (Drury, Wenner, & Murthy, 1997;
Maurino, et al., 1995).
Reason (1996) describes errors of two kinds. Active errors are those
errors that are felt almost immediately. Latent errors are those errors that
remain dormant for a long period of time but may surface much later,
sometimes having significant consequences. It is easier for accident
investigators to find the active errors while it is much more difficult to
identify latent errors that may have occurred months or even years earlier.
All levels of the aviation system contain complex levels of latent
deficiencies. It is critical that aviation human factors specialists look
beyond the individual to the larger organizational systems that affect the
way individuals make decisions.
As in most bureaucracies, major decisions in the aviation environment
are often made at the higher management levels (Parsons, 1951; Weber,
1947). These decisions affect all other levels of operation in the
organization including personnel decisions, types of aircraft, software and
manuals purchased, operating rules for flight crews and ground workers,
safety requirements, and communication structures between departments
(Westrum, 1996). Separated by time, space, or organizational linkages,
these decision makers define the working environment that will strongly
impact employee performance. Therefore, it is imperative that the broader
issues of organizational contexts and interdepartmental issues be examined
for their impact on the behavior of front-line employees (e.g., pilots and
maintenance technicians).
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As human factors models have evolved through aircraft accident and
incident analysis, different segments of the industry have been added in a
somewhat piecemeal fashion. Crew Resource Management (CRM) training
emerged as a way to begin correcting some of the previous shortcomings.
Pilot—aircraft, pilot—pilot, pilot—air traffic controller, and now pilot—
automated aircraft interfaces have been developed (Edwards & Edwards,
1990; Hawkins, 1987; Helmreich, Merritt, & Willhelm, 1999). Federal
Aviation Administration (1998) Advisory Circular 120-51C suggested that
other groups, besides pilots, also be included in company training. These
groups could include air traffic controllers, maintenance personnel,
passenger service agents, mid-level and upper-level managers, airport
operations, and special crisis teams (Bradley, 1995; Ewell & Chidester,
1996). Increasingly, many airlines subsume CRM training within general
human factors and safety training. Arguably, emerging human factors
research and training have reduced errors even though they have narrowly
focused on individual roles rather than the organizational interconnections
that occur between these individuals. By shifting to an organizational
systems framework of error management, both conceptually and
practically, an even greater impact on safety may result (Graham & Kuenzi,
1997; Maurino et al., 1995).
With this concept in mind, Purdue University researchers were
interested in learning whether interdepartmental/interdisciplinary
interaction among aviation personnel could positively influence working
relationships and impact safety. To address this question, faculty and
students from relevant disciplines worked together on a research project
designed to survey pilots and maintenance technicians from various
aviation organizations about their policies and practices for maintenance
discrepancy reporting. In addition, students involved in the research project
were surveyed about their perceptions of the importance and effectiveness
of working with students from other disciplines to learn and complete a
task.
METHOD
Survey Development: Interdisciplinary Student Research Teams
Graduate and undergraduate students from the disciplines of aviation
technology, aviation flight, aviation administration, communication, and
industrial organizational psychology were recruited for this study through
professors in these departments and by word-of-mouth. Each student was
assigned to one of five research teams. Each research team worked with a
different type of aviation organization including regional, general aviation,
corporate, and military operations. The research teams were comprised of
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students representing each discipline. A faculty member from one of the
disciplines provided oversight for each research team. The goal of the
research team was to work on the development of a survey both
independently as a team and interdependently with the other research teams
and with industry professionals. The goal of the survey was to solicit the
opinions of professional pilots and maintenance technicians about the
effectiveness of the procedures used in communicating maintenance
discrepancy information in pilot write-ups or pilot squawks.
Industry Survey
Development of the industry survey of maintenance discrepancy
reporting policies and practices occurred in four phases. First, each
research team developed potential survey questions. Second, collaboration
occurred across teams and with faculty to construct a preliminary survey
that integrated the ideas of each research team. Third, industry
representatives from each type of aviation organization were contacted for
assistance. In addition, each research team visited at least one aviation
organization and interviewed members of that organization to solicit
feedback on the preliminary survey. These industry representatives and
organizations were chosen by convenience based on prior contacts with or
proximity to the university. After discussions with industry professionals,
some questions were deleted, added, or modified. Fourth, the entire
research team met to integrate the findings from the organizational
interviews and finalize the survey.
Two versions of the survey were developed; one for pilots (see Appendix
A) and one for maintenance technicians (see Appendix B). Virtually the
same questions appeared on both surveys. The survey contained 23
questions, measured on a 7-point Likert scale, and a not applicable/don’t
know option. For example, one question posed the statement “Current
methods of maintenance discrepancy reporting need improvement” and
asked respondents to indicate their response to this statement with 1 being
strongly disagree, 4 being somewhat agree, and 7 being strongly agree. In
addition, open-ended and closed-ended questions were asked to gather
demographics and information about company training and procedures in
maintenance discrepancy reporting. For example, a close-ended, yes or no,
question asked, “A class including both pilots and mechanics, based on
communication and/or crew resource management, would be beneficial to
the work environment?” Respondents were then asked in an open-ended
fashion “Why or why not?” Blank lines were provided to write in their own
words a rationale for their responses.
A comprehensive list of aviation organizations was generated including
regional airlines, general aviation, corporate arrangements, and military
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operations. A total of 1,250 surveys were distributed to a random sample of
pilots and maintenance technicians from the organization list either by mail
or personal delivery. Two hundred twenty-two pilots and maintenance
technicians completed and returned the survey for a response rate of 18
percent. The respondents represented 55 organizations. Pilots filled out 129
(58.1 percent) surveys and 93 (41.9 percent) surveys were filled out by
maintenance technicians. This sample of responses was considered
representative of aviation industry pilots and maintenance technicians
because the individuals who completed this survey were randomly chosen.
Interdisciplinary Student Research Team Survey
Students participating in the research project were surveyed at the
beginning (i.e., pre-test) and conclusion (i.e., post-test) of the research
project (see Appendix C). A total of 50 pre-test and post-test student
surveys were collected. Due to attrition, not all students who participated in
the research project completed both surveys. These surveys contained 29
questions. Open-ended and close-ended response formats were used to
collect demographic information, perceptions about students from other
disciplines, and perceptions about working on the research project. On the
pre-test and post-test, respondents were asked to indicate their perceptions
of the various positions associated with aviation and represented on the
student research teams (i.e., maintenance technician, pilot, communication
specialist, aviation management). Issues addressed included “thinks like
me,” “status different from mine” and “background similar to mine.” The
response set was a 7-point Likert scale format with 1 indicating a strongly
disagree response and 7 indicating a strongly agree response. On the post-
test, respondents also were asked to indicate their general level of
satisfaction with participating in the research project with 1 being very
dissatisfied and 7 being very satisfied. In addition, they were asked about
the advantages and disadvantages of working on the research project in an
open-ended, free-response format.
RESULTS
Analysis of the survey results for pilots, maintenance technicians, and
students provided insight into the question of whether interdepart-
mental/interdisciplinary interaction among aviation personnel would
positively influence working relationships and impact safety. The results of
the industry survey regarding maintenance discrepancy reporting are
presented first, followed by the results of the interdisciplinary student
research team survey.
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Industry Survey
The industry survey was designed to assess current industry policies for
reporting airplane maintenance discrepancies and inquired about
respondents’ perceptions of training regarding these policies. First,
participants were queried about organizational policy for reporting airplane
maintenance discrepancies between pilots and maintenance technicians.
Respondents were given a number of choices (e.g., written logbook entry,
face-to-face reporting, etc.) and an “other” option with blank lines to write
in other policies. Most respondents reported that their organization’s
“policy for reporting maintenance discrepancies from pilots was a written
logbook entry” (n=202, 91 percent) and/or an “electronic logbook entry”
(n=33, 15 percent). Often, this policy included “face-to-face reporting”
(n=130, 58.6 percent) which was the second most frequently reported
policy.
Second, it was important to determine whether respondents thought
their organization’s policy was consistently followed and was considered
effective. While both pilots (n=129, M=6.00) and maintenance technicians
(n=93, M=5.97) thought their policy was consistently followed and was
minimally effective (pilots n=128, M=5.88, maintenance technicians n=93,
M=5.78), both groups saw several flaws in their organization’s
maintenance discrepancy reporting system. Of the 136 respondents to the
open-ended question “Which part(s) of your company’s policy for
reporting maintenance discrepancies from pilots does not work well?,” 43
(31.6 percent) wrote that the face-to-face aspect of the policy was not
working well. Sixty-three respondents (46.3 percent) wrote that some
aspect of the written or electronic logbook entries was problematic (e.g.,
lack of detail in write-up, not writing up discrepancy, ACARS codes are
vague). There were no significant differences in the responses reported by
pilots and maintenance technicians.
Third, it would be helpful to know if those using the maintenance
discrepancy reporting system thought it needed to be improved. Both pilots
and maintenance technicians (n=220) somewhat agreed that their
organization’s current method of maintenance discrepancy reporting
needed improvement (M=3.72). Again, there were no significant
differences in pilots’ (n=128, M=3.69) and maintenance technicians’
(n=92, M=3.76) responses to this question.
Finally, it was essential to examine the training pilots and maintenance
technicians received regarding maintenance discrepancy reporting. To
address the training issue, respondents were asked if they thought the
“training/instruction regarding the entire maintenance reporting system”
had been adequate. Together, pilots and maintenance technicians reported
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that their training had been somewhat adequate (n=228, M=4.73). There
was no significant difference in pilots’ (n=128; M=4.77) and maintenance
technicians’ (n=90, M=4.68) response to this question.
Further, respondents were asked if they thought that a “standardized
debriefing or interview process, to supplement the written data, would help
minimize miscommunication during maintenance discrepancy reporting.”
Pilots and maintenance technicians agreed with this statement (n=218,
M=5.23). There was no significant difference in pilots’ (n=126, M=5.25)
and maintenance technicians’ (n=92, M=5.21) responses.
Finally, to address their concern and interest in training, respondents
were asked if they thought that “a class including both pilots and
maintenance technicians, based on communication and/or crew resource
management, would be beneficial.” Of the 216 pilots and maintenance
technicians who responded to this question, 179 (82.9 percent) thought that
training integrating both groups would be beneficial. Thirty-seven
respondents (17.1 percent) did not think joint training would be beneficial.
Again, there was not a significant difference in the number of pilots or
maintenance technicians who responded either in the affirmative or
negative to this question. However, there was a significant difference in the
overall number of pilots and maintenance technicians who thought
interdepartmental training would be beneficial (n=218, p<.05).
Also, as noted in Table 1 and Table 2, there were a number of significant
correlations between the policy and training issues of interest in this study.
For both pilots and maintenance technicians, there was a significant
positive correlation between their perceptions of the effectiveness of
communication between the two groups and their perception of
effectiveness of the maintenance discrepancy reporting policy. That is,
increased perception of the effectiveness of communication was related to
an increase in their perception of the effectiveness of the policy.
There was a significant positive correlation between their perceptions of
whether the policy regarding maintenance discrepancy reporting was being
followed and whether it was an effective policy and their perceptions of the
adequacy of organizational training about maintenance discrepancy
reporting. In other words, as their perceptions about policy adherence
increased, there was a corresponding increase in their perceptions
regarding policy effectiveness.
Significant negative, or inverse correlations were found between pilots
and maintenance technicians perceptions of whether or not the policy was
being followed and was effective and whether they perceived that the
maintenance reporting system needed to be improved. That is, as
perceptions that the policy was being followed and was effective increased,
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there was an associated decrease in their perceptions that the maintenance
reporting system needed improvement.
The only correlation that was not consistently significant across the pilot
and maintenance technician groups was between their perceptions of the
effectiveness of communication and whether the policy was being
followed. While there was a significant positive correlation between these
perceptions for pilots, the relationship for maintenance technicians was not
significant. In other words, as pilots’ perceptions of the effectiveness of the
communication between pilots and maintenance technicians increased,
there was a related increase in their perceptions that the maintenance
discrepancy reporting policy was being followed. For maintenance
technicians, this relationship was not statistically significant.
Interdisciplinary Student Research Team Survey
After working together on the interdisciplinary research project there
appeared to be some marked differences in student perceptions of students
from other disciplines. Due to the small sample size (n=50; 30 pre-test, 20
post-test), only descriptive statistics are reported for the student survey and
these statistics should be interpreted with caution. On the post-test, students
generally perceived themselves as more similar to students from the other
disciplines in their thinking (pre-test n=30, M=4.90, post-test n=20,
M=5.06), behavior (pre-test n=30, M=3.83, post-test n=20, M=3.90), and
social class (pre-test n=30, M=3.76, post-test n=20 M=4.0). The only area
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Table 1. Correlation between perceptions of maintenance discrepancy reporting
policy effectiveness and compliance and training issues for pilots
Follow Policy Effective Policy
Effective Communication .401** .419**
Adequate Training .347** .440**
System Needs Improvement –.293** –.470**
n=129
** p < .01; * p < .05
Table 2. Correlation between perceptions of maintenance discrepancy reporting
policy effectiveness and compliance and training issues for maintenance technicians
Follow Policy Effective Policy
Effective Communication .153 .509**
Adequate Training .495** .449**
System Needs Improvement –.239* –.382**
n=93
** p < .01; * p < .05
on the post-test that students perceived themselves as more different from
one another after working together was in their background (pre-test n=30,
M=4.43, post-test n=20, M=4.23).
After collaborating on the research project, all students were able to
quickly list the responsibilities and tasks of students from the other
disciplines. On the pre-test (n=30), for example, many students (n=27) had
to leave one or more responses blank when asked to list the responsibilities
and tasks involved in a typical day of students studying in the other
disciplines. On the post-test (n=21), however, significantly fewer students
(n=3) were unable to list any responsibilities or tasks of students from the
other disciplines.
By having students catalog, in their own words, the advantages and
disadvantages of participation in the research project, insight was also
gained into students’ (n=21) perceptions of training together on
interdisciplinary teams. The most common advantage noted by the students
was “learning to work with other disciplines” (n=10). Some students (n=7)
also cited the “experiential nature of the project” as an advantage. The only
advantage noted more often (n=8) was “making contacts/networking
within industry.” The most often cited disadvantage of working on the
project was the unexpected amount of time the project involved (n=7).
Overall, on a scale of 1 (very dissatisfied) to 7 (very satisfied), students
(n=21) reported a mean satisfaction level of 5.52 after participating in the
research project. And one-third of the students (n=7) reported that
satisfaction with their choice of major went up as a result of working on the
project because they were exposed to industry and had an opportunity to
apply the skills they had learned in school. The other two-thirds (n=14) of
the students reported that their satisfaction with their major stayed the same
after working on the project. None of the students reported that their
satisfaction with their major decreased after working on the project.
IMPLICATIONS
This research has both conceptual and practical implications. The
aviation industry representatives who completed the survey confirmed
suspicions that during maintenance discrepancy reporting the potential for
latent safety errors exists because pilots and maintenance technicians do
not effectively interact with one another about maintenance problems on
the airplane. Additionally, respondents, who themselves are members of a
problematic organizational system, were asked to offer practical, proactive
solutions for addressing inherent safety issues within that system. Results
of both the industry survey and the interdisciplinary student research team
survey suggest some viable training implications that may aid in decreasing
errors and improving aviation safety.
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For pilots and maintenance technicians who perceived problems in their
current maintenance discrepancy reporting policy, it was agreed that
organizational training may not have been adequate and that
interdepartmental training may be beneficial. In fact, the reasons suggested
by pilots and maintenance technicians for why an integrated training course
on maintenance discrepancy reporting would be beneficial matched the
reported advantages of working on an interdisciplinary research project
reported by the students. The following paired reasons serve as examples.
“Job awareness” was a reason reported by pilots and maintenance
technicians and “awareness of the others’ job” was reported by students.
The need to “break down the wall of mistrust/conflict/close-mindedness”
between the professions was reported by the pilots and maintenance
technicians and “get to know students I wouldn’t otherwise associate with”
was reported by students. Students reported the importance of “experiential
learning” and pilots and maintenance technicians reported “need more
hands-on systems knowledge.” Many pilots, maintenance technicians, and
students noted that “stressing the importance of good communication” is
achieved through integrated interactions. Also, some pilots and
maintenance technicians thought that a joint class would help reinforce the
joint goal of “striving toward being safe and on time.” Based on the
comments and suggestions provided by pilots, maintenance technicians,
and students, it seems evident that integrating interdepartmental training
may be a viable approach toward decreasing errors. Interestingly, many
pilots, maintenance technicians, and students cited the same major
obstacles to organized interdepartmental interaction or training—time and
scheduling. Overcoming these and other logistical obstacles are necessary
considerations in the development of organizational systems training.
Additionally, the experience and responses of students who worked on
this research project seem to confirm the significance of interdisciplinary
training for increasing systems awareness and decreasing human errors.
Thus, the results of this study have implications for both academia and
industry. Involving students in research projects that provide them with
hands-on access to industry representatives better prepares them to be
active, contributing members of the aviation industry upon graduation. The
gap between book knowledge and knowledge gained through direct
experience within industry is lessened through such applied research
strategies. Moreover, the interdisciplinary nature of this research project
serves as a simulation of the type of situations students are likely to
experience should industry heed the results of this research and train
employees to work directly with relevant colleagues from other
departments or career fields (e.g., pilots and maintenance technicians in the
resolution of airplane maintenance discrepancies). Being part of realistic
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simulations like this allows students to make mistakes in a safe learning
environment yet promotes transferring these experiences to the actual
aviation environment where the ramifications of similar errors could be
much more harmful.
For industry, the interdisciplinary student research teams point to an
effective way to integrate career fields through an applied training project.
For example, by working together on reducing the potential for latent and
active human errors, pilots and maintenance technicians may better realize
and understand the importance of integrated systems thinking and
interaction in the reporting of maintenance discrepancies.
LIMITATIONS
Although this study provides some important implications for
improving existing training and safety systems, it is not without limitations.
Two main limitations were evident. First, the approach to developing the
questions and distributing the surveys may have influenced potential and
actual respondents. For example, the wording of the questions may have
skewed responses in a particular direction or discouraged recipients from
filling out the survey. Future research is needed to test the reliability and
validity of a larger pool of survey questions regarding the maintenance
discrepancy reporting process and the involvement of interdisciplinary
work team members. This may improve both the sample size and the
generalizability of the responses. Second, more consistent follow-up
measures could have increased the response rate.
CONCLUSION
Despite the limitations of this research project, the necessary evolution
of human factors theory, research, and practice were manifest in this study.
At the grassroots level, professional pilots, maintenance technicians, and
aviation students are recognizing the need for training that transcends
traditional departmental boundaries in favor of integrating individuals
across the organizational system. This approach to CRM represents a
paradigm shift in ways of thinking about and designing training. Training
developed within this perspective would emphasize ongoing,
interdepartmental, face-to-face, experiential interaction to insure that skills
learned readily translate to the daily work environment. Further, the
findings of this study promote interdisciplinary training as a way to
decrease both latent and active safety errors in the maintenance discrepancy
reporting process. The primary aviation industry goals of safety and on-
time flights are team goals not individual or department-specific goals.
Clearly, training that addresses these objectives needs to be sufficiently
integrated across departments and career fields to be maximally effective.
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APPENDIX A
INDUSTRY SURVEY OF PILOTS
Thank you for taking the time to fill out this survey. Please answer the following
questions as completely as you can. There are no right or wrong answers. Your answers
will be kept strictly confidential.
1. Company you work for:_______________
2. Number of years with the company:_______________
3. How satisfied are you with your job?
1 2 3 4 5 6
very very
unsatisfied satisfied
3a. Number of years as a pilot:______________.
4. Total flight time:__________
5 Do you have any military experience? [] Yes [] No Years:______ Rank:_______
6 What type (s) of aircraft do you fly:______________
7. Licenses or certificates you currently hold (check all that apply):
[] Airframe [] Powerplant [] FCC
[] Private [] Commercial [] Airline Transport Pilot [] other: _________
8 Type ratings:__________________________________
9. Highest level of education completed:
[] High School [] Trade School [] Some College [] College [] Graduate Degree
[] other:______________
10. Age: [] under 25 [] 26-35 [] 36-45 [] 46-55 [] 56+
11. Gender: [] Male [] Female
12. Annual Salary:
[] $25,000 or less [] $26,000-50,000 [] $51,000-75,000
[] $76,000-100,000 [] more than $100,000
13. What is your company’s policy for communicating maintenance discrepancies?
(check all that apply)
[] written logbook entry [] electronic logbook entry [] phone [] don’t have a policy
[] face-to-face reporting [] other verbal reporting [] radio [] don’t know
[] other: _________________________________________________
14. Please indicate how consistently the above policy is followed.
1 2 3 4 5 6
never always
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15. How would you rate the effectiveness of your company’s current method of reporting
maintenance discrepancies?
6 5 4 3 2 1
very very
effective ineffective
16. Which parts of your company’s policy for reporting maintenance discrepancies
WORK WELL?
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
17. Which parts of your company’s policy for reporting maintenance discrepancies DO
NOT work well?
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
18. In your opinion, how effectively do mechanics and pilots communicate with each
other?
1 2 3 4 5 6
very very
ineffectively effectively
19. How frequently do the following interfere with communication between pilots and
mechanics?
never always
Acronyms 1 2 3 4 5 6
Technical language 1 2 3 4 5 6
Accessibility to one another 1 2 3 4 5 6
Time constraints 1 2 3 4 5 6
Legibility 1 2 3 4 5 6
Error in write-up 1 2 3 4 5 6
Detail of write-up 1 2 3 4 5 6
Electronic information transfer 1 2 3 4 5 6
(for example: ACARS)
20. How often do pilots and mechanics communicate using the following forms of
communication:
very very
often seldom
Written 6 5 4 3 2 1
Face-to-face 6 5 4 3 2 1
Electronic information transfer 6 5 4 3 2 1
(for example: ACARS)
Phone 6 5 4 3 2 1
Radio 6 5 4 3 2 1
Other:____________________ 6 5 4 3 2 1
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21. With regard to the reporting of maintenance discrepancies, how effective are the
following forms of communication:
very very
ineffective effective
Written 1 2 3 4 5 6
Face-to-face 1 2 3 4 5 6
Electronic information transfer 1 2 3 4 5 6
(for example: ACARS)
Phone 1 2 3 4 5 6
Radio 1 2 3 4 5 6
Other:______________ 1 2 3 4 5 6
22. How helpful are maintenance write-ups in the following areas:
not very
helpful helpful
Hydraulics 1 2 3 4 5 6
Pneumatics 1 2 3 4 5 6
Electrical 1 2 3 4 5 6
Avionics 1 2 3 4 5 6
Powerplants 1 2 3 4 5 6
Airframe 1 2 3 4 5 6
Flight controls 1 2 3 4 5 6
Other:______________ 1 2 3 4 5 6
23. It is easier to communicate with a pilot who is:
[] Male [] Female [] No preference
24. In general, I get better write-ups from:
[] Males [] Females [] No preference
25. Generally, it is easier to communicate with a mechanic who is:
[] Older than I am [] Younger than I am [] The same age as I am [] No preference
26. Do you agree that communication barriers are created by age differences?
1 2 3 4 5 6
strongly strongly
disagree agree
27. As a pilot, do you feel you are MENTALLY:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
inferior equal superior
to pilots to pilots to pilots
28. As a pilot, do you feel you are TECHNICALLY:
7 6 5 4 3 2 1
superior equal inferior
to pilots to pilots to pilots
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29. As a pilot, do you feel you are VIEWED by mechanics as MENTALLY:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
inferior equal superior
to pilots to pilots to pilots
30. As a pilot, do you feel you are VIEWED by mechanics as TECHNICALLY:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
inferior equal superior
to pilots to pilots to pilots
31. After a flight, how WILLING are MECHANICS to talk about maintenance
problems?
6 5 4 3 2 1
very very
willing unwilling
32. After a flight, how WILLING are PILOTS to talk about maintenance problems?
1 2 3 4 5 6
very very
unwilling willing
33. After a flight, how AVAILABLE are PILOTS to talk about maintenance problems?
1 2 3 4 5 6
not very
available available
34. After a flight, how AVAILABLE are MECHANICS to talk about maintenance
problems?
6 5 4 3 2 1
very not
available available
35. How would you rate your understanding of the entire maintenance reporting system?
1 2 3 4 5 6
do not fully fully
understand understand
36. Do you think that the training/instruction about the entire maintenance reporting
system has been:
1 2 3 4 5 6
very very
inadequate inadequate
37. To what extent do you think a mechanic knows YOUR job?
6 5 4 3 2 1
very not very
knowledgeable knowledgeable
38. I think of mechanics as colleagues. [] Yes [] No
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39. A class including both pilots and mechanics, based on communication and/or crew
resource management, would be beneficial to the work environment: [] Yes [] No
Why or why not?______________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
40. Current methods of maintenance discrepancy reporting need improvement.
1 2 3 4 5 6
strongly strongly
disagree agree
41. What percentage of the time do you think miscommunication between pilots and
mechanics is a problem in maintenance write-ups? (circle one)
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
42. Maintenance write-ups are NOT important.
1 2 3 4 5 6
strongly strongly
disagree agree
43. Regarding maintenance discrepancy reporting, the application of a standardized
debriefing or interview process, to supplement the written data, would help minimize
miscommunication.
1 2 3 4 5 6
strongly strongly
disagree agree
Thank you for your cooperation in filling out this survey—you have made an important
contribution to aviation research!
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APPENDIX B
INDUSTRY SURVEY OF AVIATION
MAINTENANCE TECHNICIANS
Thank you for taking the time to fill out this survey. Please answer the following
questions as completely as you can. There are no right or wrong answers. Your answers
will be kept strictly confidential.
1. Company you work for:_______________
2. Number of years with the company:_______________
3. How satisfied are you with your job?
1 2 3 4 5 6
very very
unsatisfied satisfied
3a. Number of years as a mechanic:______________.
4. Do you have any military experience? [] Yes [] No Years:_______ Rank:______
5. What type (s) of aircraft do you work on:______________
6. Licenses or certificates you currently hold (check all that apply):
[] Airframe [] Powerplant [] FCC
[] Private [] Commercial [] Airline Transport Pilot [] other: ______
7. Type ratings:__________________________________
8. Total flight time:____________
9. Highest level of education completed:
[] High School [] Trade School [] Some College [] College [] Graduate Degree
[] other:______________
10. Age: [] under 25 [] 26-35 [] 36-45 [] 46-55 [] 56+
11. Gender: [] Male [] Female
12. Annual Salary:
[] $25,000 or less [] $26,000-50,000 [] $51,000-75,000
[] $76,000-100,000 [] more than $100,000
13. What is your company’s policy for communicating maintenance discrepancies?
(check all that apply)
[] written logbook entry [] electronic logbook entry [] phone [] don’t have a policy
[] face-to-face reporting [] other verbal reporting [] radio [] don’t know
[] other: _________________________________________________
14. Please indicate how consistently the above policy is followed.
1 2 3 4 5 6
never always
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15. How would you rate the effectiveness of your company’s current method of reporting
maintenance discrepancies?
6 5 4 3 2 1
very very
effective ineffective
16. Which parts of your company’s policy for reporting maintenance discrepancies
WORK WELL?
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
17. Which parts of your company’s policy for reporting maintenance discrepancies DO
NOT work well?
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
18. In your opinion, how effectively do mechanics and pilots communicate with each
other?
1 2 3 4 5 6
very very
ineffectively effectively
19. How frequently do the following interfere with communication between mechanics
and pilots?
never always
Acronyms 1 2 3 4 5 6
Technical language 1 2 3 4 5 6
Accessibility to one another 1 2 3 4 5 6
Time constraints 1 2 3 4 5 6
Legibility 1 2 3 4 5 6
Error in write-up 1 2 3 4 5 6
Detail of write-up 1 2 3 4 5 6
Electronic information transfer 1 2 3 4 5 6
(for example: ACARS)
20. How often do pilots and mechanics communicate using the following forms of
communication:
very very
often seldom
Written 6 5 4 3 2 1
Face-to-face 6 5 4 3 2 1
Electronic information transfer 6 5 4 3 2 1
(for example: ACARS)
Phone 6 5 4 3 2 1
Radio 6 5 4 3 2 1
Other:______________ 6 5 4 3 2 1
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21. With regard to the reporting of maintenance discrepancies, how effective are the
following forms of communication:
very very
ineffective effective
Written 1 2 3 4 5 6
Face-to-face 1 2 3 4 5 6
Electronic information transfer 1 2 3 4 5 6
(for example: ACARS)
Phone 1 2 3 4 5 6
Radio 1 2 3 4 5 6
Other:______________ 1 2 3 4 5 6
22. How helpful are maintenance write-ups in the following areas:
not very
helpful helpful
Hydraulics 1 2 3 4 5 6
Pneumatics 1 2 3 4 5 6
Electrical 1 2 3 4 5 6
Avionics 1 2 3 4 5 6
Powerplants 1 2 3 4 5 6
Airframe 1 2 3 4 5 6
Flight controls 1 2 3 4 5 6
Other:______________ 1 2 3 4 5 6
23. It is easier to communicate with a pilot who is:
[] Male [] Female [] No preference
24. In general, I get better write-ups from:
[] Males [] Females [] No preference
25. Generally, it is easier to communicate with a pilot who is:
[] Older than I am [] Younger than I am [] The same age as I am [] No preference
26. Do you agree that communication barriers are created by age differences?
1 2 3 4 5 6
strongly strongly
disagree agree
27. As a mechanic, do you feel you are MENTALLY:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
inferior equal superior
to pilots to pilots to pilots
28. As a mechanic, do you feel you are TECHNICALLY:
7 6 5 4 3 2 1
superior equal inferior
to pilots to pilots to pilots
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29. As a mechanic, do you feel you are VIEWED by pilots as MENTALLY:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
inferior equal superior
to pilots to pilots to pilots
30. As a mechanic, do you feel you are VIEWED by pilots as TECHNICALLY:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
inferior equal superior
to pilots to pilots to pilots
31. After a flight, how WILLING are PILOTS to talk about maintenance problems?
6 5 4 3 2 1
very very
willing unwilling
32. After a flight, how WILLING are MECHANICS to talk about maintenance
problems?
1 2 3 4 5 6
very very
unwilling willing
33. After a flight, how AVAILABLE are PILOTS to talk about maintenance problems?
1 2 3 4 5 6
not very
available available
34. After a flight, how AVAILABLE are MECHANICS to talk about maintenance
problems?
6 5 4 3 2 1
very not
available available
35. How would you rate your understanding of the entire maintenance reporting system?
1 2 3 4 5 6
do not fully fully
understand understand
36. Do you think that the training/instruction about the entire maintenance reporting
system has been:
1 2 3 4 5 6
very very
inadequate inadequate
37. To what extent do you think a pilot knows YOUR job?
6 5 4 3 2 1
very not very
knowledgeable knowledgeable
38. I think of pilots as colleagues. [] Yes [] No
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39. A class including both pilots and mechanics, based on communication and/or crew
resource management, would be beneficial to the work environment: [] Yes [] No
Why or why not?______________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
40. Current methods of maintenance discrepancy reporting need improvement.
1 2 3 4 5 6
strongly strongly
disagree agree
41. What percentage of the time do you think miscommunication between pilots and
mechanics is a problem in maintenance write-ups? (circle one)
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
42. Maintenance write-ups are NOT important.
1 2 3 4 5 6
strongly strongly
disagree agree
43. Regarding maintenance discrepancy reporting, the application of a standardized
debriefing or interview process, to supplement the written data, would help minimize
miscommunication.
1 2 3 4 5 6
strongly strongly
disagree agree
Thank you for your cooperation in filling out this survey—you have made an important
contribution to aviation research!
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APPENDIX C
INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDENT RESEARCH TEAM SURVEY
Post-Test Perceptions Survey
THANK YOU for taking a few minutes to reply to this follow-up survey. There are no
right or wrong answers; we are interested in your most truthful response to the
questions and issues. Your answers will be kept strictly confidential.
1. Age __________ 2. Gender ______ male _____ female
3. What year in school are you? _____Freshman _____ Sophomore
_____ Junior _____ Senior
4. Circle the number that corresponds with your current level of satisfaction with your
major.
Very Dissatisfied 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very Satisfied
5. Since beginning work on this research project, what has happened to your level of
satisfaction with your major? (check one)
_____ Gone Up _____ Stayed the Same _____ Gone Down
If your satisfaction with your major has changed, what occurred to influence the
change?
6. Describe your background or experience in aviation maintenance (i.e., courses taken,
internships, work experience).
Do you have an A & P certificate? __________
7. Describe your background or experience in aviation flight operations (i.e., courses
taken, internships, work experience).
Ratings and Certificates? ____________________________________________
Total Flight Hours? _________________________________________________
8. Describe your background or experience in aviation management (i.e., courses taken,
internships, work experience).
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9. Describe your background or experience in communication such as; public relations,
customer service (i.e., courses taken, internships, work experience).
10. Describe any training you have received on how to write-up airplane maintenance
discrepancies.
11. Have you ever written or read an airplane maintenance discrepancy report? _______
If yes,
What was your general impression of the report(s)?
12. Did you also speak to the maintenance technician or pilot about the discrepancy?
If yes,
What was your general impression of this interaction?
On the scales below, please indicate your feelings about the various jobs associated with
aviation. Circle the number that best represents your feelings. Numbers “1" and ”7"
indicate a strong feeling. Numbers “3" and ”5" indicate a weak feeling. Number “4"
indicates you are undecided or don’t know. Please work quickly. Remember, there are
no right or wrong answers.
Aviation Mechanics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Pilots 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13. Doesn’t think like me Thinks like me
Communication Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Aviation Management 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Aviation Mechanics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Pilots 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14. From social class From social
similar to mine class different
Communication Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 from mine
Aviation Management 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Aviation Mechanics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Pilots 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Doesn’t
15. Behaves like me behave
Communication Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 like me
Aviation Management 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Aviation Mechanics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Pilots 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Economic
16. Economic situation situation is like
is different from mine mine
Communication Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Aviation Management 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Aviation Mechanics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Pilots 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
17. Similar to me Different from
Communication Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 me
Aviation Management 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Aviation Mechanics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Pilots 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
18. Status like mine Status
Communication Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 different
Aviation Management 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 from mine
Aviation Mechanics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Pilots 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
19. Unlike me Like me
Communication Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Aviation Management 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Aviation Mechanics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Pilots 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
20. Background different Background
from mine similar to mine
Communication Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Aviation Management 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Based on your general knowledge and the information you have gained by working on
this project, answer the following questions in your own words.
21. List the responsibilities of:
an aviation maintenance technician.
a communication specialist.
a pilot.
aviation management.
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22. What is involved in the typical day of:
a communication specialist?
aviation management?
a pilot?
an aviation maintenance technician?
23. What do you think is most important to:
an aviation maintenance technician?
a communication specialist?
a pilot?
aviation management?
24. How does aviation management’s work differ from your work in the aviation
environment?
How does an aviation maintenance technician’s work differ from your work in the
aviation environment?
How does a communication specialist’s work differ from your work in the aviation
environment?
25. What kind of training do you think aviation management receives?
What kind of training do you think aviation maintenance technicians receive?
What kind of training do you think communication specialists receive?
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26. Are you aware of any nicknames/terms/phrases that are used in reference to each of
the following groups? If so, please write the nickname/term/phrase and explain what
it means.
aviation maintenance technicians
What does it mean to use this nickname/term/phrase?
pilots
What does it mean to use this nickname/term/phrase?
aviation management
What does it mean to use this nickname/term/phrase?
communication specialist
What does it mean to use this nickname/term/phrase?
27. List below the pros and cons of working on this aviation research project.
Pros Cons
28. Circle the number that corresponds with your overall level of satisfaction with this
research project.
Very Dissatisfied 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very Satisfied
Thank you, again, for completing this survey and being involved in this research
project!!
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OPTIMIZING AIRSPACE SYSTEM CAPACITY
THROUGH A SMALL AIRCRAFT
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM: AN ANALYSIS
OF ECONOMIC AND OPERATIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS
Scott E. Tarry
and
Brent D. Bowen
Omaha, Nebraska
ABSTRACT
America’s air transport system is currently faced with two equally important dilemmas. First,
congestion and delays associated with the overburdened hub and spoke system will continue
to worsen unless dramatic changes are made in the way air transportation services are
provided. Second, many communities and various regions of the country have not benefited
from the air transport system, which tends to focus its attention on major population centers.
An emerging solution to both problems is a Small Aircraft Transportation System (SATS),
which will utilize a new generation of advanced small aircraft to provide air transport
services to those citizens who are poorly served by the hub and spoke system and those
citizens who are not served at all. Using new innovations in navigation, communication, and
propulsion technologies, these aircraft will enable users to safely and reliably access the over
5,000 general aviation landing facilities around the United States. A small aircraft
transportation system holds the potential to revolutionize the way Americans travel and to
greatly enhance the use of air transport as an economic development tool in rural and isolated
communities across the nation.
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INTRODUCTION
For all the benefits of the hub and spoke system that evolved in the
United States after deregulation and throughout the world as air carriers
recognized the system’s efficiencies, there are some serious social and
economic implications for communities unable to take full advantage of the
system. Small, rural, and otherwise isolated communities struggle to
maintain air service as air carriers pursue their rational commercial
interests and concentrate their activities in larger markets and strategically
defined route networks. With changes in the way society and the economy
function, air service has become even more important for future growth and
development.
This paper examines the plight of small and rural communities in the
U.S. and briefly examines some of the current policies for alleviating the
negative impact of the hub and spoke system. Finding these political
solutions lacking for a variety of reasons, the paper examines the Small
Aircraft Transportation System (SATS) as a technological solution
emerging from cooperative work between government, industry, and
academia. An important point about this solution is that it does not argue
for the elimination of the hub and spoke system for long haul air carrier
operations. In fact, SATS should alleviate some of the pressure on capacity-
constrained hub airports by optimizing the use of non-hub and general
aviation airports. Moreover, SATS promises to bring reliable cost-effective
air service to communities that have been marginalized by the hub and
spoke system without altering the way in which air carriers conduct their
business. The needs of rural and isolated communities can be addressed
without political arm-twisting or “re-regulation” of the airlines. These
needs can be addressed without costly subsidization of regional carriers
who would otherwise not serve these low-demand communities. SATS
offers a rare opportunity for government and industry to work together to
efficiently meet the political and social needs of the nation’s small
communities and rural areas.
The balance of the paper examines the need for SATS through an
analysis of recent trends in air transport, the economy, and society more
generally. The discussion focuses on the inherent problems of the hub and
spoke system, the emergence of the information or digital economy, and
important social and demographic trends that will determine the demand
for transportation services in the future. Once the problem is defined, the
paper explores conventional political solutions and examines the
difficulties associated with such efforts. The paper then details the SATS
concept and examines the potential for SATS to improve air transport
services in small and rural communities in the U.S. Finally, the paper
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assesses the exportability of SATS to other parts of the world where
alternatives to hub and spoke are attractive and in other places where any
form of reliable and efficient air transport services would be welcomed.
HUB AND SPOKE
The hub and spoke system that emerged following regulatory reform of
the airline industry in the U.S. has been a double-edged sword for the
industry and the nation. Hub and spoke provides efficiencies that are
unavailable in point-to-point and other route network systems (Hanlon,
1996; Gialoretto, 1988). The ability of carriers to consolidate operations,
better coordinate vast route networks, and control hub airports has
benefited both the carriers and the communities that host hub airports
(Button, Lall, Stough & Trice, 1999). Unfortunately, hub and spoke is not
without its problems and these problems are becoming increasingly clear.
Hub airports throughout the U.S. are rapidly reaching capacity. According
to the National Civil Aviation Review Commission (NCARC, 1997) the
nation’s aviation system is quickly heading towards gridlock (NCARC, see
also Long et al., 1999 and Donohue, 1999). In 1999, approximately 680
million passengers boarded airplanes in this country (USDOT, 2000). The
capacity for our hub-and-spoke system is estimated at one billion
boardings, and at the forecasted growth rate in the United States we will
reach that capacity somewhere between 2005 and 2010 (FAA, 1998). By
2020, the demand for boardings will approach 1.5 billion if enough
additional capacity can be developed in time (NCARC, 1997).
“Traffic data and trends indicate that adding just a few minutes of delay
to each airline flight in the United States will bring the aviation system to
gridlock with dramatic negative impacts on the economy” (NCARC, p. I-
2). It can cost $1 billion to build a single new runway and as much as $10
billion to build a new airport. With an average lead-time of ten years
between conception and construction, it is unlikely that we will be able to
generate the infrastructure needed to keep pace with demand (U.S. GAO,
1997).
Some improvements include possibly squeezing the maximum capacity
from what we already have through annual maintenance, better
management, increased use of intelligent transportation innovations, and
cost-effective improvements in capacity (Hansen, 2000). Even if it were
politically and socially possible to augment the current system through 24-
hour operations, the use of super jumbo jets, more regional jets, free flight,
aggressively reducing aircraft separation requirements, and completing the
few new runways currently planned, the system would still be
overwhelmed. The problem, however, is that even many of these solutions
are not practical in the current or foreseeable future.
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The concept of 24-hour operations ignores both the demands of the
consumer for convenient flight schedules and the demands of airport
communities for quiet evenings. The use of super jumbos will depend on
the commercial strategies of air carriers and the willingness and ability of
airports to make necessary infrastructure improvements to handle these
enormous aircraft. More regional jets might help, but only if these smaller
aircraft begin to avoid hubs and fly more point-to-point routes. Free flight
and reduced separation will allow for more efficient use of airspace, but
both require technological developments and cultural changes within the
air traffic control community that are slow in coming (see Aviation
Foundation, 1996). Moreover, even if airspace issues can be addressed
successfully, problems remain on the ground where aircraft interface with
other parts of the intermodal system. Unfortunately, the prospect of new
runways and new airports diminishes in the face of huge costs,
environmental concerns, and intransigence by air carriers who loudly voice
their fears about bearing the brunt of the costs.
More importantly, though, for the purposes of this analysis, squeezing
these improvements out of hub and spoke would not adequately address the
long-term needs of air transport or the specific needs of the communities
that are ignored by the present system. The system needs a solution that
both helps to alleviate the current and future pressure on system capacity
and brings air transport services directly to more areas of the country.
Current efforts to address the latter issue are problematic because they
rely on government to restructure the market to provide air transport
services to communities that are not served in the hub and spoke system.
While there is demand for air transport in these communities, the demand is
not sufficient to attract the attention of air carriers who are seeking to
maximize revenues with traditional business plans (USDOT, 1998a).
Regional jets are unlikely to serve the interests of these communities since
these aircraft are larger and require infrastructure that is often unavailable.
As hubs get more crowded, pressure will increase to utilize larger aircraft
and fewer flights. This is the case in San Francisco, where the airport has
requested that United Airlines fly fewer regional or commuter aircraft into
the busy airport.
Since the air carriers are continuing to move away from small
communities, political leaders have taken initiatives to preserve or enhance
air transport services through legislation. Since deregulation some small
communities have relied on the Essential Air Service program to preserve
their air service (USDOT, 1998b). This subsidy program uses tax dollars to
subsidize air transport services to communities with load factors that are
too low to attract purely commercial service. According to the U.S.
Department of Transportation, the EAS will cost over $30 million this year
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and provides twice a day turbo-prop service between 77 small communities
and hub airports. Unfortunately, preserving air services in this manner is
costly and not necessarily effective in meeting the real needs of the
community. More recently, some states have embarked on their own efforts
to secure or enhance air transport services. Maryland is initiating a subsidy
program to enhance air service between a number of small airports and
Baltimore Washington International (Maryland DOT, 2000). New York has
also embarked on a subsidy program that will, according to the schemes’
proponents, deliver badly needed air services to rural and small
communities in the state (State Budget, 2000).
In the end, such schemes are problematic. On a financial level, the
services provided are expensive. The operation of 19-seat aircraft on routes
that only provide 25 percent load factors is an obvious waste of money.
Unfortunately, the way the air carrier industry is structured, both
commercially and in terms of regulations, these aircraft are typically the
smallest equipment that can be used. The use of such aircraft raises
additional concerns such as passenger perceptions about small propeller-
driven aircraft. Passengers may forego flights on these aircraft even if the
service is provided because of unpleasant experiences on such aircraft or
perceptions about safety and comfort. These aircraft are also more prone to
cancellation due to weather than their larger jet counterparts. Travelers who
rely on the small aircraft to take them to a hub to make connections to
flights on major airlines discover that the regional leg of their journey is
often the most unreliable. A delay or cancellation at the regional airport can
completely disrupt an itinerary. Taken together, perceptions about safety,
reliability, and comfort work against the regional carrier. Potential
passengers will avoid the service by driving or foregoing their trips, a
phenomenon known as leakage.
DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL CHANGE
The current limitations of the hub and spoke system will be exacerbated
by two trends in modern American society. First, demographic trends
suggest that more Americans will move away from metropolitan areas and
into rural communities (Johnson and Beale, 1998). Second, early
indications from the information age suggest that time and travel speed will
be motivating factors for personal and consumer decisions (Schafer and
Victor, 1997). Taken together, these trends describe a population whose
needs are unlikely to be met by the current hub and spoke system. More
travelers will live away from metropolitan areas and hub airports. These
same travelers will be acutely interested in reducing travel times and having
reliable access to a variety of new destinations.
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THIRD MIGRATION WAVE
America’s ‘first migration wave’ from rural communities to the cities
can be traced back to the era of Andrew Jackson in the 1820s. In total
population, however, rural America still continued to grow, but at a much
slower pace than urban America. The growth that remained in our rural
communities was almost exclusively due to the fact that rural women bore
enough children to offset rural deaths and out-migrations of families to the
cities.
The ‘second migration wave’ from the cities to the suburbs is closely
associated with the affordability of the automobile and with the baby boom
that followed World War II. While the swelling of metropolitan areas and
the growth of suburbs defined American life for the first seven decades of
the 20th century, a new trend might define the next seven decades. Recent
information indicates that “What the United States experienced between
1970 and 1996—and is continuing to experience, according to recently
released Census Bureau data—is population de-concentration. People are
gradually moving away from larger, more densely settled places toward
lightly settled areas” (Johnson & Beale, 1998, p. 18). Economic and
technological change is allowing many Americans to choose where they
want to live.
This third migration wave or ‘in-migration’ from the suburbs to rural and
remote communities is driven by economic, social, and technologic forces.
The requirement for large numbers of blue-collar workers reporting to
nearby factories has been greatly reduced in the Information Age.
Human/intellectual capital is displacing the role that physical capital
played in the industrial age. The rise in information technology has made
rural areas much less isolated, at least in terms of communications and
information, than they were at the height of the industrial age. The
paradoxical result of this latest wave of migration is that as the information
age frees people to move away from urban and suburban areas, it also
forces them to consider time more carefully. The speed of commerce and
information increases, but the speed of travel remains stagnant or even
declines as capacity limits are met in both surface and air transport sectors.
MEETING THE TRANSPORT NEEDS OF THE NEW ECONOMY
We will soon see an inevitable clash between a population that is
becoming more dispersed and concerned about door-to-door travel speeds
and an air transport infrastructure that is rapidly approaching saturation.
For the variety of reasons mentioned earlier traditional solutions are
unlikely to be of much lasting help. A new approach to transportation and a
new framework for cooperation between industry and government is
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required. Old ways of doing business will only produce expensive half-
measures, such as publicly subsidized turbo-prop air service, which fail to
provide the desired levels of service at an acceptable cost.
This new approach will build on newly developed aircraft technologies
and existing infrastructure. The key, however, is that the technology will
allow for dramatic increases in usable airport and airspace capacity. While
scheduled commercial air service is provided to consumers at a mere 400
airports in the United States, general aviation can provide services to over
5,000 public facilities and as many as 18,000 landing facilities if private
airports are included (GAMA, 1999). Studies show that over 90 percent of
the U.S. population lives within 30 minutes of a public-use general aviation
airport (Holmes, 2000). The existing general aviation airport infrastructure
represents a vast, underutilized capacity for the nation. By expanding all-
weather access to the nation’s existing public-use airports, the National
Airspace System capacity (measured in annual seat-departures) could be
increased by a factor of ten compared to the existing commercial hub and
spoke system. This increased accessibility and throughput of a more fully
utilized infrastructure would contribute substantially to the National
Airspace System safety, cost, and efficiency.
Building on the success of the NASA led Advanced General Aviation
Transport Experiment (AGATE) consortium and the General Aviation
Propulsion program, the NASA-led National General Aviation Roadmap
(Holmes, 1999) establishes a framework for coordinating public and
private sector investments leading to development of a national Small
Aircraft Transportation System (SATS). The Roadmap goal is to cut inter-
city travel time in half in 10 years at a total system cost that is competitive
with Interstate highway travel.
The Small Aircraft Transportation System, in conjunction with the
existing network of general aviation airports, holds the potential to provide
the nation with a transportation innovation that relieves current pressures
on our ground and air systems, land use, and environment (Whitehead,
1997). SATS will be a safe travel alternative, freeing people and products
from transportation system delays and creating access to more
communities in less time. Virtually every small community in the nation
will have the potential to be served by SATS.
WHAT IS SATS?
The Small Aircraft Transportation System grows out of the successful
collaboration of industry and government to improve general aviation
technologies through the AGATE consortium. NASA officials and industry
representatives recognize that new technologies could dramatically change
the face of general aviation and move small aircraft from the domain of the
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hobbyist or aviation enthusiast to the domain of the cost-conscious, safety-
minded traveler. These technologies include improved avionics, more
reliable and efficient power plants, improved flight management
equipment, and enhanced information technologies. The current three-
pronged SATS effort seeks to develop small aircraft and related
technologies that are:
1. Capable of flight in near all-weather conditions,
2. Suitable for high-density operations; and
3. Built with the techniques and processes adopted from the automotive
sector.
In each case, the goal is to produce an air vehicle that is safe, reliable,
and cost-competitive. More importantly perhaps, the emphasis is on the
vehicle and will not rely on expensive or extensive infrastructure
improvements, such as longer runways, increased land-use, or elaborate
ground-based communications, navigation, or surveillance systems.
Table 1 outlines the technical components of the SATS concept. The first
three items are the focus of the current program, while other technologies
will be developed or integrated as the program evolves.
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Table 1. Technical Components of the Small Aircraft Transportation System
 Virtual Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC), which includes virtually
autonomous vehicles, human aided automation, virtual terminal procedures, integrated
vehicle and air traffic services automation, control de-coupling, and envelope
protection.
 High Density Operations, which includes client-client-based separation and
sequencing in non-radar airspace, and non-interfering approaches at Class B airports.
 Automotive Synergies, which include affordable manufacturing of vehicles through
the use of thermoplastics, aluminum, composites, and intergrated airframe desgin and
manufacturing processes.
 Airborne Internet, which includes satellite-based communications-navigation-
surveillance in all airspace.
 Ultra-propulsion, which includes non-hydrocarbon and heat engine options, low-
noise/emissions, and low maintenance engines.
 Smart Airports, which include airport database for remote sensing and monitoring of
airport, runway, and weather conditions.
 Wireless Cockpit, which include open architecture systems, through-the-window
displays, and software-enabled controls.
 Cyber-tutor and Internet-based training, which includes both embedded and onboard
training and expert systems.
 Extremely slow take-off and landing, which includes configuration aerodynamics for
slow and vertical operations as well as roadability of vehicle.
SATS will begin with a 5-year focused program effort to prove that
“SATS works.” While NASA works to show that the technologies
integrated into SATS aircraft will work to dramatically change the way
Americans think about air travel, other stakeholders, especially the states
will explore social, economic, and environmental impacts. Current plans
call for a multi-state demonstration of SATS in 2005.
WHAT SATS CAN DO FOR RURAL AND SMALL COMMUNITIES
SATS has the potential to solve the problem of access to safe, reliable,
and affordable air transport. Rural and small communities that suffer from
inadequate or nonexistent air service can reap the benefits of SATS without
the considerable expense typically associated with airport infrastructure
development. SATS does not rely on new or expanded runways or
prohibitively expensive instrument landing systems. Communities
therefore can avoid the risk associated with a “build it and they will come
strategy.” Such a strategy is fraught with problems since commercial air
carriers are unlikely to make service decisions based solely on the quality
of the landing facilities. Adequate infrastructure is a necessary, but not
sufficient, requirement for attracting commercial air service in the current
market. Fortunately, SATS will allow small communities to reap the
benefits of reliable air service without having to provide costly
infrastructure up-grades or the load factors expected by commercial
airlines.
SATS can effectively lower the barriers to quality air transport services.
Currently planned aircraft, such as the Eclipse and the Safire are exciting
precursors to SATS aircraft. These small jets will be the first shots in the
battle to revolutionize personal transportation. Powered by innovative
engines and guided by the latest flight management technologies, the
Eclipse and the Safire will make on-demand, point-to-point air travel price
competitive with current coach travel, which entails all the downsides of
the hub and spoke system. The Eclipse, for example, is a six seat
pressurized jet aircraft with projected operating costs of less than $.50 per
airplane mile (Eclipse Aviation, 2000). Further technological advances and
the automotive synergies that are a primary goal of the SATS program will
further drive costs down and eventually extend the reach of such air service
to small, remote landing facilities with even the most minimal level of
infrastructure.
Such technological advances will address the problems posed earlier in
this paper. With the hub and spoke system reaching saturation and time
becoming the most precious commodity in our information-oriented
society, travelers will demand fast, efficient, and reliable transportation
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tailored to their needs in terms of schedules and destinations. While some
conventional airlines may recognize this market and seek to address its
demands with smaller regional jets, truly small and remote communities
will still lack the infrastructure and the load factors necessary to attract
adequate air service. Those communities will not be able to participate
fully in the global economy unless those air service needs are met. An
attractive solution to this problem is the Small Aircraft Transportation
System described in this paper.
IS SATS EXPORTABLE?
This paper has focused almost entirely on the problems and prospects
for air transport in the U.S. One can easily imagine, though, that the SATS
concept offers considerable hope for other countries facing air transport
dilemmas. Although not similar in all regards, the congestion at major U.S.
airports is mirrored at Europe’s major airports. While enhancing its already
exceptional rail service might be an attractive means for reducing air
transport congestion, rail is still governed by fixed schedules to hub cities.
As time becomes a more important criterion to savvy travelers in Europe,
the SATS concept might become an attractive option.
More likely, however, is that SATS will have appeal in nations with
widely dispersed, small communities that need air service but do not
receive it without substantial government subsidy for conventional air
carrier service. As is the case in the U.S., such service rarely meets the
needs of the traveler and requires the government to spend scarce resources
on a service that is inadequate. Such inadequate service, as in the U.S.,
achieves a political goal but too often does not satisfy more important
social and economic goals. Nations such as Australia, Canada, Brazil,
Russia, and various other nations throughout South America and Africa
would be good candidates for SATS since they tend to have limited and
unreliable air transport services for their small, rural communities. SATS
aircraft could provide access to areas previously without service because of
the lack of adequate landing facilities for all but the smallest, most
antiquated aircraft. SATS aircraft could effectively serve these
communities with reliable, safe, and efficient services without the need for
substantial state subsidy or a constant stream of revenue passengers as
required in the air carrier business.
The impact on economic development is obvious. Investors will be able
to develop new production facilities in areas previously eliminated from
practical consideration because of the lack of air service. New investment
and the subsequent development of infrastructure in remote communities
might ease the pressure of migration to urban areas taking place in
74 Journal of Air Transportation World Wide
developing countries. These communities will also benefit from the timely
and cost-effective provision of social services. The social and economic
development potential of SATS is exciting and worth serious consideration
by investors, policy makers, and those interested in spreading the wealth of
opportunity the global economy offers.
CONCLUSION
SATS is a concept that proposes a technological solution to a number of
critical transportation and economic development problems. It is certainly
not a cure-all since it will not likely prevent the gridlock forecasted for the
hub and spoke system. The demand for conventional air transport services
will continue to grow as the economy grows and the result will be a system
saturated to the point where the needs of many travelers are no longer met.
SATS is also not a panacea for every small community that lacks adequate
air service. SATS is not a promise to provide air service as an entitlement. It
does, however, offer a much better means for providing access to reliable
and efficient air transport than the current system, within which air carriers
focus on large markets and within which government subsidies seem to
waste scarce resources subsidizing services that fail to meet most travelers’
needs. SATS can reduce the need for substantial infrastructure investment
and reduce the demand threshold for attracting reliable air transport
services. In the end, SATS promises to be a paradigm shift that will make
air transport an even more useful tool for business and leisure.
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BARGAINING FOR OPEN SKIES
Oliver W. Wojahn
Hamburg, Germany
ABSTRACT
In this paper we analyze the bargaining problem between countries when negotiating bilateral
air service agreements. To do so, we use the methods of bargaining and game theory. We give
special attention to the case where a liberal minded country is trying to convince a less liberal
country to agree to bilateral open skies, and the liberal country might also unilaterally open
up its market. The following analysis is positive in the sense that the results help explain and
predict the outcome of negotiations under different payoffs and structures of the bargaining
process. They are normative in the sense that adequate manipulation of the bargaining
conditions can ensure a desired outcome.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to systematically analyze the bargaining
problem between countries when negotiating bilateral air service
agreements. We will give special attention to the case where a liberal
minded country is trying to convince a less liberal country to agree to
bilateral open skies, and the liberal country might also unilaterally open up
its market. The following analysis is positive in the sense that the results
help explain and predict the outcome of negotiations under different
payoffs and structures of the bargaining process. They are normative in the
sense that adequate manipulation of the bargaining conditions can ensure a
desired outcome.
The basis for all air service agreements is the Chicago Convention,
which entered into force on 4 April 1947. It establishes the principle that
each state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above
its territory. Thus all international air transport is subject to authorization,
which is accomplished through a system of some 3000 bilateral (and very
few regional) agreements. The classic bilateral air service agreement of the
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Bermuda 1 type includes detailed provisions for market access, capacity
and tariffs.
Although recent air service agreements tend to be more liberal in some
or all of these aspects (see for example World Trade Organization, 1998,
and Morrell, 1998), many still fail to completely deregulate markets.
Recognizing that further deregulation provides scope for more trade in
airline services and thus more gains in trade, some countries have been
pushing towards bilateral open skies agreements. For example, the U.S. has
signed open skies air service agreements with 42 countries and is pressing
further (Oum, 2000).
Other countries may adopt a less liberal attitude towards air services.
First, for some reason a country may take the position that further
deregulation does not enhance national welfare (Forsyth, 2000). Second,
even if total national welfare is enhanced, distributional effects might be
undesirable. Third, even if redistribution is socially acceptable, it might
come at the expense of special interest groups. These organized few (i.e.,
airlines, airports, labor unions) may secure rents from the government at
the expense of the unorganized many (i.e., consumers) by lobbying against
deregulation.1 Fourth, a country might speculate that hiding its true
(liberal) preferences will provide an opportunity to free ride on the
deregulation of foreign markets while keeping the domestic market shut.
Considering this, it is not too surprising that negotiations towards more
liberal bilateral air service agreements are in many cases stagnant.2
Another option for a liberal country (A) then is the unilateral opening of
its home market to a less liberal country (B). For example the Australian
government has decided to offer foreign international airlines unrestricted
access to all of Australia’s international airports except Sydney,
Melbourne, Brisbane, and Perth (Australia’s Commonwealth Department
of Transport and Regional Services, 1999). The Canadian Transport
Minister in response to the domestic dominance of Air Canada/Canadian
Airlines announced that “if over a period of 18 months, a couple of years,
competition doesn’t come forward, then we’ll invite foreign carriers in”
(Air Transport World, June 2000, p. 9).
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1For example, on February 10, 2000, the CAPA, an association of U.S. airline pilot
unions, addressed the U.S. Department of Transportation in an open letter, stating that they
were unalterably opposed to the exchange of cabotage rights.
2The following examples provide some anecdotal evidence. In 1998 and 1999 Germany
approached 10 countries where prospects for bilateral open skies seemed promising. By
February 2000, negotiations hit a deadlock in all but one case. David Marchkick, the chief
United States negotiator in aviation rights talks with the United Kingdom, recently resigned
as an expression of his frustration of the slow pace of talks over open skies (London Financial
Times, October 9, 1999).
But a unilateral opening may imply that country A further discourages
country B to accept a liberal bilateral agreement, as the reward from such an
agreement, the opening of A’s market, already pertains to B: the “carrot”
has been fed to B in form of a unilateral opening and A’s feed bag is empty.
In the next section, we formalize these notions into different bargaining
processes and present equilibrium results that depend on countries’
preferences, information sets and the structure of bargaining. Policy
implications and further conclusions follow in the final section.
THE MODEL
Consider the bargaining problem between a liberal country A and a less
liberal country B.3 Air traffic between A and B is regulated by a restrictive
air service agreement. Denote the payoff to A (B) under agreement i by a i
( b i). If A and B do not negotiate or if they fail to reach an agreement, we
normalize payoffs to ( a 0, b 0) = (0, 0) per period, representing the status quo
or the threat point.
Country A may decide to unilaterally open up its market (A and B
“agree” on “1”), resulting in total discounted payoffs of ( a 1, b 1) at the time
of market opening. Unilateral opening might encompass full market access
for B to, from, and beyond country A, cabotage within A, etc. whereas
country A’s traffic rights with B remain restricted. Countries A and B may
also agree on “2”, bilateral open skies (or at least a higher degree of
deregulation than under the existing agreement), resulting in discounted
payoffs of ( a 2, b 2) at the time of agreement.
Note that payoffs are the additional rents that deregulation provides and
b 2 is the carrot. We will restrict analysis to these three distinct cases
although one might argue that actual bargaining might also cover other
degrees of deregulation.
Both A and B are fully rational in the sense that they bargain to maximize
expected payoffs, any bounded rationality, problems of special interest
groups, etc., then are captured in the payoffs. We will assume that both
unilateral and bilateral deregulation improve total welfare of the two
countries:4
a 2 + b 2 ‡ 0 and a 1 + b 1 ‡ 0. (1)
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3The analysis does not change if A is a deregulated region that has given a mandate to
negotiate on behalf of the whole region.
4From the general theorem of the second best it follows that a small departure from the
first best (unilateral open skies) need not be better than a large one (bilateral regulation). Thus
it need not be the case that a 2 + b 2 ‡ a 1 + b 1.
By assumption A is liberal which implies a 2 ‡ 0, a 1.5 Hence payoffs for
A can take two forms:
Aw: a 2 > a 1 > 0, in this case we will say that A is weak (for reasons that
will later become apparent). Denote a weak A by Aw.
As: a 2 > 0 > a 1, in this case we will say that A is strong, denoted by As.
The strict inequalities rule out indifference between the alternatives and
thus simplify the following arguments.
If country B values bilateral deregulation higher than both unilateral
opening on behalf of A and the status quo ( b 2 > b 1, 0) then A and B have
common interests and will agree on bilateral open skies. Furthermore,
b 1 < 0 cannot be part of B’s payoff because unilateral open skies give B all
opportunities it has under the status quo, plus some more. Thus we are left
with two different possible payoff structures for B:
Bw: b 1 > b 2 > 0, in this case we will say that B is weak. Denote a weak B by
Bw.
Bs: b 1 > 0 > b 2, in this case we will say that B is strong, denoted by Bs.
Country B is strong if the carrot is small.
In all models, countries A and B cannot make binding agreements or
commitments apart from those explicitly mentioned (“1” and “2”, so far).
In particular, they cannot agree on side payments, that is they cannot
arrange payoffs ( a i - D , b i + D ), and they cannot (credibly) ex ante commit
to make unilateral restrictions that are not rational ex post.
In what follows, we will analyze various sequential structures of
bargaining between different types of A and B by applying the according
equilibrium concepts. We employ a strategic approach, which embodies a
detailed description of the bargaining procedure, because it is especially
suitable to model and analyze negotiations between governments or states
on an international level (Holler and Illing, 1990, p. 241).
In contrast to the strategic approach, the axiomatic approach relies on
desirable properties that the outcome of a bargaining problem should
comply with. Due to the leeway involved in defining desirable properties,
there are numerous axiomatic solution concepts. In the case of two possible
agreements, two axioms (Selten’s axioms) suffice to establish the most
commonly applied Nash solution (Harsanyi, 1987):
1. Monotonicity. Starting with a symmetrical game ( a 1 = b 2 and a 2 =
b 1) and increasing one or both payoffs of an agreement will make this
agreement the solution of the new game.
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5Any other preference ordering would be trivial, anyway: a 1 ‡ 0, a 2 implies that A opens
unilaterally and 0 ‡ a 1, a 2 implies that A realizes the threat point.
2. Linear Invariance. The outcome will not change under an order-
preserving linear transformation of utilities.
Assume that both countries are weak. Then under monotonicity and
linear invariance, the solution to our bargaining problem is unilateral
opening of Aw if a 1 b 1 > a 2 b 2 holds, and bilateral open skies if a 2 b 2 > a 1 b 1
holds. In the following sections, we will apply the strategic approach.
Bargaining with Complete Information and a Finite Horizon
One-shot Bargaining
Denote a bargaining process over T periods between parties i and j
where i moves first in period T (the last period) by G T(i, j). Now consider
G 1(B, A), the case of a one-shot bargaining process where first B makes an
offer and then A either accepts or rejects.6 Every aspect of the bargaining
process is common knowledge, that is A and B know the structure of the
bargaining process and each others payoffs, and they know that they know,
and so on.
Figure 1: One-shot Bargaining Process G1 (B, A).
Figure 1 depicts the extensive form of G 1(B, A) where dominated
strategies are eliminated: neither Bw nor Bs ever offer “0” because both can
secure at least those payoffs by offering “1”, and neither Aw nor As ever
reject offer “2”. By backward induction we obtain the subgame-perfect
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6B offering unilateral opening of country A may be interpreted as B not offering anything.
equilibria, that is the Nash equilibria that do not involve noncredible
threats. The payoffs of G 1(B, A) then are as in Table 1 (the according
strategies are straightforward).
Table 1: Payoffs of G1(B, A)
As Aw
Bs (0, 0) ( a 1, b 1)
Bw ( a 2, b 2) ( a 1, b 1)
If country A is of type Aw, the result of the bargaining process will
always be unilateral opening of Aw because Aw cannot credibly threaten not
to open unilaterally if B offers “1”, and B knows this. This absence of a
credible threat ( a 1 > 0) makes Aw weak.
If A is strong it credibly threatens not to open up if offered “1” (0 > a 1)
and then equilibrium depends on the type of B: Bw will offer “2”, because
bilateral opening offers a higher reward than the status quo ( b 2 > 0) and As
will accept. In contrast, Bs will not offer “2” (0 > b 2) and As will not open up
its market when offered “1”. Both realize their threat point because it is
individually rational not to agree to the unfavorable agreement. In this case
neither country is at its bliss point, and even in the absence of side payments
there is room for improvement on both sides.
Proposition 1 (Pareto-improving Lottery). If both countries are strong
and risk neutral and any deregulation improves total welfare, then there
exists a Pareto-improving lottery.
Proof. Let L denote a lottery where unilateral open skies are drawn with
probability p and bilateral open skies with probability (1 – p) . If As is risk
neutral, it will accept L if and only if p a 1 + (1 – p) a 2 ‡ 0 or, rearranging,
a 2p£ ______ ” pA, where 0 < pA < 1. (2)
a 2–a 1
Risk neutral Bs will offer L if and only if p b 1 + (1 - p) b 2 ‡ 0 or,
rearranging,
p ‡
-
”
b
b b
2
2 1
pB, where 0 < pB < 1. (3)
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Lottery L will be offered and accepted if and only if pB £ p £ pA. Now
assume that no such lottery exists which implies pB > pA. Applying
Equation 2 and Equation 3 and rearranging yields
a 1b 2 > a 2b 1. (4)
Deregulation improves welfare: a 2 + b 2 ‡ 0 and a 1 + b 1 ‡ 0. This can be
rearranged to a 2 ‡ – b 2 and b 1 ‡ – a 1, and combining the two yields
a 2 b 1 ‡ a 1 b 2, contradicting (4) and thus the assumption. n
Figure 2: Payoffs With and Without Lottery.
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 1. If As and Bs could enter a binding
agreement to conduct a lottery L with pB £ p £ pA, both could secure a
higher expected payoff because the lottery convexifies the payoff
possibilities. This lottery may for example come in the form of third party
arbitration where the probabilities of ruling in favor of any outcome are as
described above.7
Now consider G 1(A, B), that is A makes an offer and B accepts or rejects.
The equilibrium payoffs of G 1(A, B) are identical with those of G 1(B, A)
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7Note that at this point we are introducing further possibilities of binding agreements,
changing the nature of the bargaining process from noncooperative to cooperative.
except if both players are weak, where G 1(A, B) results in bilateral open
skies (see Table 2).
Table 2: Payoffs of G1(A, B)
As Aw
Bs (0, 0) ( a 1, b 1)
Bw ( a 2, b 2) ( a 2, b 2)
The reason is that if both countries are weak, any agreement (“1” or “2”)
makes both parties better off than no agreement (“0”), and the first mover in
the only and thus last round of bargaining chooses the agreement serving
him best. Hence the country preparing the last offer has bargaining leverage
because it can credibly commit.
Repeated Bargaining
Repeated Bargaining with a Single Country
Now consider the case of T > 1 rounds of bargaining between A and B,
and suppose that countries discount future payoffs by a factor of p ˛ (0, 1)
per period. If an agreement is reached, bargaining is stopped and each
player gets the according payoff. Again, every aspect of the bargaining
protocol is common knowledge, including the maximum number of
bargaining rounds T and who moves first in each period.
Proposition 2. If countries do not discount future payoffs, then only the
last round of bargaining determines equilibrium. Formally, G T(i, j) has the
same equilibrium payoffs as G 1(i, j).
Proof. Suppose Aw and Bw are bargaining and Bw prepares the offer in
period T, Aw then either accepts or rejects. As T is the last period, the parties
face a one-shot situation as in Figure 1. Thus Bw will offer “1” and Aw will
accept, resulting in payoffs of ( a 1, b 1), see Table 1.
First suppose that Aw is entitled to make an offer in period T–1. Bw will
only accept offers “i” that yield a payoff of b i ‡ b 1, otherwise B would wait
another period and realize profits b 1 in period T. Hence Bw would reject
offer “2” and Aw will offer “1”, which Bw accepts.
Next suppose that Bw is entitled to make an offer in period T–1. Aw
accepts any offer “i” resulting in a payoff of a i ‡ a 1, otherwise it would
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prefer to wait until period T and realize a 1. But here Bw will realize its bliss
point by offering “1”, which Aw accepts.
So no matter who makes an offer in period T–1, the bargaining will
result in payoffs ( a 1, b 1). Now we may repeat the same argument for period
T–2, and so forth up to period 1. Whoever makes an offer in the first period
will offer “1” and the other country will accept.
All other cases can be shown in a similar manner. n
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows: if up to period T–1 no
agreement has been reached, the resulting bargaining situation is as in the
one-shot setting. As time is not costly, any side can credibly threaten to wait
for the last round to secure the payoffs of the one-shot bargaining game,
thus no other outcome can be an equilibrium. Actual agreement may be
reached in any round of bargaining. The equilibrium is invariant with
respect to the order in which offers are made up to and including round T–1.
Hence the country preparing the offer in round T has the full bargaining
power.
Now we are concerned with the equilibria if countries do discount future
payoffs.
Proposition 3. If at least one country is strong, then Proposition 2 also
holds if countries discount future payoffs (ρ < 1)
Proof. Consider G T(As, Bw) and G T(Bw, As). In round T, parties will agree
on “2”, no matter who moves first (see Tables 1 and 2). Now assume that As
moves first in round T–1: Bw will accept any offer “i” that provides
payoff b i ‡ ρ b 2, therefore As will offer “2” and Bw will accept. If Bw moves
first in period T–1, As will accept any offer “i” with αi ≥ ρα2. Because of
ρ > 0 and α2 > 0 this implies αi > 0. As α1 < 0 holds for As, offer “1” will be
rejected. Because B is weak, b 2 > b 0 holds and B will offer “2”. So in T–1,
parties will agree on “2”, no matter who moves first. This argument can be
repeated for T–2 and so forth up to period 1.
All other cases can be shown in a similar manner. n
Proposition 3 indicates that if a strong and a weak country bargain, the
strong country will always be able to enforce its first best outcome, because
the alternative agreement is worse than the status quo. Consequently, two
strong countries will always realize the threat point. Delay is costly and
hence if parties agree, they will do so in the first round and bargaining is
terminated immediately, “…from an economic point of view, the
bargaining process is efficient (no resources are lost in delay)” (Osborne
and Rubinstein, 1990, p. 50).
Proposition 4. If both countries are weak, then the equilibrium depends
on the structure of bargaining in the first and in the last round and on the
relative sizes of payoffs.
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The resulting equilibria under all possible bargaining situations are
summarized in Figure 3 (not to be confused with an extensive form game).
If both countries are weak, discounting may change the equilibrium
outcome. If the discounted first best is worse than the second best, then a
party will agree to a proposal of the second best, even if it could secure the
first best in the next round.
Figure 3: Equilibria of ΓT(Aw, Bw) and ΓT(Bw, Aw).
Here too, equilibrium is always reached in the first round. The equilibria
depend on the relative sizes of the payoffs, the discount factor, and which
country prepares the offer in the last and in the first round, although the first
round only matters if both countries do not care too much about getting the
second best instead of the first best.
To clarify the workings behind Proposition 4, we will present the
induction process for the case where Aw offers in T, α1 > ρα2 and b 2 < ρ b 1,
which results in unilateral open skies (“1”).
In period T, Aw offers “2” and Bw accepts. First assume that Aw offers in
T–1. Country Bw accepts any offer “i” where b i ≥ ρ b 2. Hence Aw will offer
“2” and Bw will accept. This argument can be repeated leading to
equilibrium “2” if Aw always offers (displayed as a separate branch in
Figure 3).
Let period T – k, 1 ≤ k < T, be the last period where Bw offers. By the
above induction process we know that in period T – k + 1, Aw offers “2” and
B accepts. So in period T – k, Aw will accept any offer “i” such that αi ≥
ρα2. By assumption, α1 > ρα2 and hence Bw will offer “1” and Aw will
accept.
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Turn to period T – k – 1. Aw will accept any offer “i” where αι ≥ ρα1. So
should Bw offer in T – k – 1 then it will offer “1” and Aw will accept. On the
other hand, Bw would accept any offer such that b i ≥ ρ b 1. But, by
assumption, b 2 < ρ b 1 and thus Bw would reject “2”. Then Aw offers “1” and
Bw accepts. This argument can be repeated for all periods T – k – 2 to 1, and
the equilibrium agreement is “1”. So to change the equilibrium from “2” (in
the case where Aw prepares all offers) to “1”, it is sufficient that Bw has the
chance to make a single offer in any period, given α1 > ρα2 and b 2 < ρ b 1.
The bargaining situation ΓT is akin to Selten’s chain-store game (Selten,
1978). Take the case where both countries are weak, b 2 < ρ b 1, and Bw
moves first in the last period. Country Aw might be tempted to reject
unilateral open skies in the first rounds (or, if Aw moves first, it might be
tempted to offer bilateral open skies) to convince Bw that it is playing tough
and will not accept unilateral opening. But in the last period, there is no
reason for Aw to convince Bw that it is playing tough anymore, indeed it
would be irrational not to open up unilaterally as this would imply a loss of
a 1 > 0. But if the outcome of period T does not depend on anything that has
happened before, why should Aw bother playing tough in T–1? Neither does
it generate any immediate payoff nor is it profitable in the future, that is
period T. So Aw will not play tough in T–1. This argument can be repeated
and the logic of backward induction is incorruptible: Aw will not play tough
and will open unilaterally in the first round; there is no scope for reputation
building.
Bargaining with Different Countries
Now take G T and modify it such that there are T different less liberal
countries Bi, and country A engages in a one-shot bargaining process with
Bi in period i.
The argument for reputation building on behalf of A then seems even
stronger. Consider the case where all countries are weak and Biw moves first
in period i. As Biw is only bargaining once, it cannot recoup the losses it
incurs if Aw rejects offer “1”. So if Aw has rejected offer “1” for, say, k
periods, then Bk+1w, who observes this, might be convinced that Aw will
again reject if offered “1”, which in turn would imply that Bk+1w offers “2”.
But this reputation effect does not withstand scrutiny, as the above
backward induction argument demonstrates.
Instead, the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium consists of the
realization of the one-shot equilibrium in each period. Introducing a slight
uncertainty on the side of the Biw about the nature of A (Aw or As) does give
room for reputation building, as will become apparent later.
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Bargaining with an Infinite Horizon
So far we have assumed that the total number of periods of bargaining is
bounded and common knowledge. In this setting, the last period is
especially important as it confers bargaining leverage due to the solution
concept of backward induction. Because in many practical settings there is
no fixed last period of bargaining, it is desirable to overcome this
artificiality. Therefore we are now concerned with the results if the
countries believe that bargaining will only stop after an agreement has been
reached and otherwise continue indeterminately, that is T fi ¥ . In addition,
we will relax the notion of a detailed bargaining protocol, instead each
country can make an offer or react to an offer in each period.
Assume that ρ ˛ (0, 1); time is strictly valuable. If one of the countries is
strong and the other is weak, the weak country can at no time expect the
other side to agree on the weak country’s first best alternative. Hence the
best the weak country can achieve is its second best, which is the strong
country’s first best. Knowing this, the cost of delay lets the weak country
offer or agree to its second best in the first period. If both countries are
strong, they will never agree because any agreement is to the disadvantage
of one side compared to doing nothing.
The more interesting case arises if both countries are weak such that
both unilateral and bilateral open skies benefit both parties. Assume that at
the beginning of each period, any of the two parties may concede and
accept the first choice of the other party. Assume that payoffs are
symmetric: a 1 = b 2 = p 0 and a 2 = b 1 = p +.8
If neither of the countries concedes in period t the bargaining continues
in period t+1 and payoffs for period t are ( a 0, b 0) = (0, 0). If country Aw
concedes in period t and unilaterally opens its market then bargaining stops
and payoffs are ( a 1, b 1) = ( p 0, p +). Similarly, if country Bw concedes in
period t and agrees to a liberal bilateral agreement then bargaining stops
and payoffs are ( a 2, b 2) = ( p +, p 0). If both countries concede in the same
period then payoffs are (0, 0).
This is a discrete-time war of attrition, and the costs of not conceding are
the delayed benefits of deregulation. A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
consists of Aw’s strategy to never concede and of Bw’s strategy to
immediately concede, for another one just swap names.
Of more interest, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in mixed
strategies. Denote by p the constant probability that one country concedes
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8A mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium has the unpleasant property that the equilibrium
strategy of a country only depends on the payoffs of the other country and not on its own
payoffs. This counterintuitive property is circumvented by equalizing payoffs.
given that the other has not yet conceded. Denote the expected discounted
value of a country’s payoff if it continues bargaining by Vcon. Then with a
probability of p (which is the probability that the other country surrenders)
the payoff is large ( p +) and with a probability of 1 – p (the probability that
the other country continues bargaining) the payoff is the discounted
expected value of the next period:
Vcon = pp + + (1 – p)ρ Vcon. (5)
On the other hand, surrendering yields p 0:
Vsur = p 0. (6)
In a mixed-strategy equilibrium the payoffs of continuing and
surrendering have to be equal, and from Equation 5 and Equation 6 we get
1–ρ
p*= ___________ . (7)
p
+/p 0––ρ
The strategies of each player to concede with probability p* in period t if
the other player has not surrendered before t then form a subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p. 120).
Equation 7 reveals some interesting comparative static results of
equilibrium behavior. As impatience of the countries grows (ρ runs from 1
to 0) the probability of surrendering increases (p* runs from 0 to p 0/ p +). So
if time is not costly, nobody will ever concede. If on the other hand delay is
so costly that next period’s payoffs are worthless, then countries will
concede with probability p 0/ p + < 1.
As the additional benefits from winning grow ( p +/ p 0 runs from 1 to + ¥ )
the probability of surrendering decreases (p* runs from 1 to 0). Countries
fight longer if the prize is big. The expected bargaining time may be
calculated by interpreting t as time. Then each country surrenders
according to a Poisson process with parameter p* and the probability of a
country still bargaining at time t, given that the other country still bargains,
is exp(–p*t). As these probabilities are independent as long as bargaining
continues, the probability that the bargaining is still in progress at time t is
exp(–2p*t), which yields expected bargaining time of 1/(2p*) with variance
1/(2p*)2.
Although continuing to bargain does not induce any direct monetary
costs on the countries, there are opportunity costs for postponing a
mutually favorable agreement. As in equilibrium both continuing and
surrendering yield the same expected payoff, it follows that all additional
rents above p 0 are dissipated by delaying agreement so long until the
expected discounted payoff equals p 0. Note that the postponement of an
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agreement has no socially valuable by-product, thus dissipation is socially
wasteful.
Bargaining with Incomplete Information
So far we have assumed that all aspects of bargaining are common
knowledge and deterministic. But incomplete information and/or
randomness may come in many modes. Country A may not know Country
B’s payoffs, or vice versa, or both. Countries might be unsure about their
own payoffs, especially of those in the distant future. There could be
uncertainty about the duration of the bargaining process or about the exact
structure of the game. Payoffs might be random, for example they may
depend on the mix of business and tourist passengers, which in turn
depends on the weather, or payoffs may depend on the outcome of the next
election.
Most of these extensions are beyond the scope of this paper, instead we
focus on the case of incomplete information which permits reputation
building on behalf of A. The following analysis is a simple application of
results established by the seminal work of Kreps and Wilson (1982) and
Milgrom and Roberts (1982) on the building of reputation under
incomplete information.
Under complete information, the logic of backward induction precluded
the building of a reputation on behalf of A, motivating the chainstore-
paradox. Now take another look at the bargaining process between country
A and T different weak countries Btw.9 Countries A and Btw engage in a one-
shot bargaining process of type G 1(Btw, A) in period t ˛ {1, … , T}.10
Countries maximize discounted payoffs.
The main innovation is uncertainty on behalf of the Btw concerning the
type of country A they are bargaining with: they initially assess the
probability d that A is strong with payoffs a 2s > 0 > a 1s and probability
(1 – d ) that A is weak with payoffs a 2w > a 1w > 0. Country A on the other
hand knows its type and also knows that B is weak. Denote this game by
G T(Btw, A d ).
Assume that payoffs are symmetric in the sense that the gains from
improving from second best to first best in relation to the gains from
improving from the worst to the second best are identical for As and Aw:
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9If the countries Bt are strong there is no need for reputation building on behalf of A.
Country Bt
s
never offers “2” because it is dominated by offering “1” ( b 2 < 0).
10The results do not change if A repeatedly bargains with a single country B, as long as the
agreements are only valid for the period in which they have been made.
a 2
w
– a 1
w
a 2
s
a ” _________ = – ____ , (8)
a 1
w
a 1
s
where a > 0 follows from the assumptions regarding payoffs. Let
b 1 – b 2b ” _______ , (9)
b 1
where a large b coincides with a small carrot. As B is weak it holds true that
0 < b < 1. Now a positive affine transformation of payoffs does not change
the bargaining game between A and Btw and yields the bargaining process of
a single period as depicted in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Bargaining Process with One-Sided Uncertainty
All parties can observe all moves and countries Btw update their belief
about A each period by Bayesian learning. Denote by pt the probability
assessed by country Btw that A is strong. Then pt is a sufficient statistic for
the history of play up to date t, and choices in period t only depend on pt and
for A on Btw’s offer.
First turn to the case where a > 1, that is A gains more from getting the
first best instead of the second best than it loses if it gets the worst instead of
the second best. Assume further that A does not discount, ρ = 1. Then the
following beliefs and strategies form a sequential equilibrium of
G T(Btw, A d ) which under some weak conditions is unique (Kreps and
Wilson, 1982, p. 264).11
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11A Bayesian equilibrium satisfies the fixed-point condition that strategies are optimal
given beliefs and beliefs are obtained from strategies by Bayesian learning. A sequential
equilibrium puts further restrictions on the consistency of beliefs off the equilibrium path (see
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991).
Equilibrium Beliefs
1. If Bt–1
w
offers “2” then pt := pt–1.
2. If Bt–1
w
offers “1”, A rejects and pt–1 > 0 then pt := max{bT– t+1, pt–1}.
3. If Bt–1
w
offers “1” and A accepts or pt–1 = 0 then pt := 0.
Equilibrium Strategy of A
1. As and Aw always accept “2”.
2. As always rejects “1”.
3. If Aw is offered “1” at stage t, then the response depends on t and pt:
(a) If t < T and pt ‡ bT–t then reject.
(b) If t < T and pt < bT–t then reject with probability ,
accept with complementary probability.
(c) If t = T then accept.
Equilibrium Strategy of Btw
1. If pt > b
T–t+1 then offer “2”.
2. If pt < b
T–t+1 then offer “1”.
3. If pt = b
T–t+1 then offer “2” with probability 1/a.
Equilibrium beliefs are formed as follows: if A is offered bilateral open
skies then nothing is learned about A because both As and Aw always accept.
If A opens up unilaterally for a single country Bw, it is established in all
following negotiation rounds that A is weak because a strong A always
rejects offer “1”. If A rejects unilateral open skies then the probability of A
being strong is adjusted upward. Late rejections of “1” allow for higher
probabilities of A being strong as the benefits of reputation building for Aw
fade towards the end of bargaining.
This in turn explains why it is an equilibrium strategy of Aw to accept
offers “1” towards the end that it would have rejected earlier. Country Btw
on the other hand offers bilateral open skies if it assesses a small probability
of A being strong or if there are only few rounds of bargaining left.
Let k( d ) = sup{t: d < bT–t+1}. For t < k( d ), country A will never accept
unilateral open skies and Btw will offer bilateral opening. In period t = k( d ),
there is a non-vanishing probability that a weak A would accept unilateral
opening, but this probability is too small for Btw to offer accordingly. In
periods t > k( d ), Btw may offer “1” and Aw may accept. It is remarkable that
in periods 1 to k( d ), the less liberal countries do not test A with offer “1”
because they know that A would reject to build its reputation.
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(1–bT–t)pt
___________
(1–pt)bT–t
If the initial belief that A is strong is large ( d large), then there will be a
prolonged period where A is not tested. The same holds if the carrot is large
(b small). This fact is depicted in Figure 5 for the case where A bargains
with 10 different weak countries. If T is sufficiently large, even a very small
initial assessment that A is strong leads to bilateral open skies in the first
periods.
Figure 5. Number of Rounds where A is not Tested in G10(Btw, Ad ).
Extensions
So far we have assumed that a > 1 and ρ = 1. The main characteristics of
equilibrium do not change for 0 < a £ 1 or for discounting on behalf of A at
a rate of ρ > 1/(1 + a) or, equivalently, ρ > a 1w / a 2w. Equilibrium behavior
may get more complicated towards the end.
If on the other hand ρ £ a 1w / a 2w holds, then the character of equilibrium
does change: country Aw will accept the first offer “1” and Btw will offer “1”
Wojahn 93
if pt < b, “2” if pt > b. Building its reputation by not opening unilaterally
then does not pay off for A because a bilateral agreement in round t + 1 is
worth less than a unilateral opening in round t.
Another possible extension is the introduction of two-sided uncertainty
so that neither country is sure about the payoff structure or type of the other
side. Kreps and Wilson in their original work do consider two-sided
reputation formation, and they find that the resulting game is very similar to
a war of attrition game. More recently, Abreu and Gul (2000) consider a
model of two-sided incomplete information, two-sided offers, and multiple
types, where players bargain over a “pie” of fixed size. The resulting
equilibrium has a war of attrition structure and the bargaining outcome is
independent of the bargaining protocol.12 So, as long as both sides have an
interest in building reputation and uncertainty is two-sided, the war of
attrition seems to be a natural outcome.
CONCLUSION
In the preceding analysis we have presented different bargaining
procedures pertaining to the problem of negotiating bilateral air service
agreements and we have deduced the according equilibria. The former
analysis is of course by no means complete: we have concentrated on the
case of two countries and two possible agreements. Extending the analysis
to regional air service agreements and thus multilateral bargaining is easy
in the case of Nash’s axiomatic approach, as it extends unchanged to
multilateral situations. In the case of the strategic approach, the exact rules
and the procedure of bargaining determine the outcome, and equilibria
need not be unique.13 Furthermore, we have ignored any transaction costs
associated with bargaining. Despite these shortcomings, we believe that the
above analysis provides some guidance for a structured positive analysis.
Now we are concerned with policy implications. Countries may exert
influence on the bargaining situation via two levers: payoffs on the one
hand and the structure of bargaining on the other. So far we have assumed
that both are exogenous, but in many cases there is room for manipulation.
The following discussion is informal, a rigorous treatment would have to
incorporate the decisions with respect to bargaining structure and payoff
manipulation into the structure of the game tree.
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12Abreu and Gul (2000) also provide a detailed discussion of the related literature.
13Krishna and Serrano (1996) consider the case where n players bargain over a pie of
fixed size. Under their bargaining procedure, the equilibrium agreement approximates the
n–player Nash solution if players are patient. Under different bargaining procedures this need
not be the case.
Assume that we are to advise country A and that our concern is total
welfare. Assume further that total welfare is highest if bilateral open skies
are agreed on so that our interests are also A’s (otherwise we would advise
B). Depending on the other conditions, the following advice may be in
order:
1. If country B is strong, make it weak. One way to do this is to sweeten
bilateral open skies, such that b 2 > b 0. For example, one might grant
route traffic royalties or bundle air service negotiations with non-
aviation quid pro quos which are in the interest of B. Another way of
making B weak is to spoil the status quo and thus achieve b 2 > b 0.
This may be accomplished if country A sets standards (e.g. technical)
that are costly to achieve for B.14
2. If country A is weak, get strong (get a 0 > a 1). Country A may try to
make unilateral open skies costly to achieve, for example by passing
according legislation, by making public statements and by
mobilizing special interest groups. This gives credibility to the threat
of not opening up unilaterally if B fails to approve to bilateral open
skies.
3. If country A is weak, appear strong. Emphasizing that one is very
happy with the status quo and considers unilateral opening as harmful
may plant a seed of doubt regarding the true nature of A into some B.
As we have seen before, even a very small initial assessment of A
being strong can be sufficient for A to build a reputation.
4. Choose the right order of bargaining partners. First, signing open
skies agreements with like-minded countries may be convenient, but
it may also seriously deteriorate the bargaining position vis-à-vis less
liberal countries. If only few agreements have been signed so far,
there is a much stronger case for A to build a reputation and the less
liberal countries, knowing this, may be more prone to agree on
bilateral open skies at this stage.
5. Choose the right intervals of bargaining. By changing the time
between bargaining rounds, A can influence the discount factor and
hence the equilibrium outcome if both players are weak. For example
take the case where a 1 = 9, a 2 = 10, b 1 = 10 and b 2 = 5. Both countries
discount at 6.38 percent per year. Now take the game G T(Aw, Bw). If
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14For example, the Dutch Government supposedly threatened to withhold payments to
NATO until the U.S. granted some concessions to KLM (Hanlon, 1996, p. 80).
bargaining takes place every second year, then we get ρ = 0,8836. It
follows that a 1 > ρ a 2 and b 2 < ρ b 1, resulting in unilateral opening of
A in equilibrium. If bargaining takes place every year, we get
ρ = 0,94. Then it holds that a 1 < ρ a 2, resulting in bilateral open skies
in equilibrium.
6. Avoid wars of attrition. As these wars soak up all of the additional
rents, they are in nobody’s interest. So in the case of complete
information, try to fix an end date of bargaining. In the case of two-
sided uncertainty, employ an economic adviser to reduce uncertainty
about payoffs and types of players.
Although there are many reasons for less liberal countries to reject
bilateral open skies, there are nearly as many means to fabricate the
bargaining protocol and to manipulate payoffs. The above analysis
provides guidance how and to what extent payoffs have to be corrected and
how bargaining should be structured to achieve a socially desirable
outcome.
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AVIATION SYSTEM SAFETY AND PILOT
RISK PERCEPTION: IMPLICATIONS FOR
ENHANCING DECISION-MAKING SKILLS
Mavis F. Green
Daytona Beach, Florida
ABSTRACT
This research explores risk perception in a defined population of flight instructors and the
implications of these views for flight training. Flight instructors and students engaged in
collegiate aviation flight training were interviewed for this qualitative study. Thirty-three
percent of the instructors interviewed reported that flying is not a risky activity. This is
important because research identifies risk perception as one factor influencing instructional
choices. These choices can then impact the subsequent decision-making processes of flight
students. Facilitating pilot decision-making through the use of an appropriate type of learning
that incorporates the modeling of consensually validated cognitive procedures and risk
management processes is discussed.
Issues of safety are of paramount importance in the field of aviation. The
Federal Aviation Administration’s Safer Skies initiative (1998), for
instance, is a primary vehicle for addressing issues of safety. One goal of
this initiative is to achieve “a significant reduction of general aviation
accidents and fatalities” (p. 1). To accomplish this goal for general aviation,
the initiative suggests an emphasis on pilot decision-making as well as loss
of control, weather, controlled flight into terrain, survivability, and runway
incursions.
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Flathers, Giffin, and Rockwell (1982) studied decision-making behavior
of pilots facing a deviation from a planned flight. They found that
differences in decision-making related to several factors, including grade of
pilot certificate, the amount and type of initial and recurrent training, and
the type of flying most commonly done. In this study, they found that pilot
training affected subsequent decision-making and suggested that “A closer
examination of the training and certification process is in order” to improve
pilot decision-making (Flathers et. al., 1982, p. 963). O’Hare and Roscoe
(1990) also state that “Most national and international aviation
organizations are increasingly accepting the position that flight training,
particularly in general aviation, is a problem” (pp. 61–62). They continue
that to increase safety, more attention needs to be paid to the judgmental
education of professional pilots in addition to the traditional emphasis on
training in skills and procedures.
What is the best way to teach good pilot decision-making skills? One
way, suggested by Bandura (1986), is by using strategies which take into
account the amount of risk involved with aviation. A study by Green (1998)
suggests that instructional choices can be influenced by the degree to which
flight instructors perceive an activity as high-risk. The instructional choices
made by the flight instructors can then impact subsequent decision-making
processes of their students. This research explores factors that affect risk
perceptions, the perceptions of risk identified in a defined population of
flight instructors, and the implications of these views on aviation training.
BACKGROUND
Risk Perception
It is obviously important to understand those factors which influence the
practitioner’s perception of risk and to determine whether prevailing
attitudes among flight instructors identify the activity as being high-risk in
nature. High-risk is defined for these purposes as the potential in an activity
for loss of life or limb, litigation, loss of reputation, and/or expenditures of
large amounts of money if a pitfall or in-flight problem is mishandled.
Thompson (1993) explores risk perception. She proposed that principles
of realism, optimism, and flexibility affect the amount of personal control
experienced and the adaptiveness of naturally occurring perceptions of
control. She stated that: “In considering how people judge the control
available to them, it appears that people often have optimistic estimates of
their control that focus on what they can influence, downplay the areas
where control would be difficult, and overestimate the likelihood of their
influence being successful” (Thompson, 1983, p. 89). Thompson also
states that even when people do not feel they can exert primary control, they
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maintain perceived control by trusting in the ability of others to help them
(secondary control). Reliance by a pilot on ATC to avoid weather or other
problems is an example of this. Thompson stated in explaining “bounded
flexibility” that: “Many people seem to overestimate their potential for
influence, but judgments of personal control are also responsive to
objective limits and subjectively perceived constraints on an individual’s
influence” (Thompson, 1983, p. 89). Boundaries are thus provided to these
individual perceptions.
Wickens (1992) states that “people’s perception of risk seems to be
guided by the availability of examples of the risky event in long-term
memory” (p. 294). He cites the work of Slovic, Fischoff, and Lichtenstein
(1981) that reports certain risks are considerably overestimated while
others are greatly underestimated by people and that “perceived risks are
directly correlated with the amount of publicity that the varying hazards
receive in the media” (p. 294). Wickens also reports that personal
experience plays a role in availability and the estimated risks of an activity
decreases for people who have had accident-free experience with an
activity (Karnes, Leonard, and Rachwal, 1986 cited in Wickens, 1992,
p. 294). Personal experiences may be misleading, however. Pilots with no
personal encounters with “pitfalls” in training or in flight may therefore not
consider either aviation in general or a specific task to be a risky activity.
Slovic (1987) states that “those who promote and regulate health and
safety need to understand the ways in which people think about and
respond to risk” (p. 280) and that this information can be used to direct
educational efforts. Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) cited in Slovic (1987)
assert that “people, acting within social groups, downplay certain risks and
emphasize others as a means of maintaining and controlling the group”
(p. 281). Slovic (1987) states that “when experts judge risk, their responses
correlate highly with technical estimates of annual fatalities” (p. 283) but
that “expert’s judgments appear to be prone to many of the same biases as
those of the general public” (p. 281). He reports that lay people may have
differing evaluations of the risk of an activity because of the use of a
different definition of risk that may include, for instance, catastrophic
potential. Slovic (1987) exemplifies this variation in a table that quantifies
the perceived risk by different groups for 30 activities. General aviation is
ranked as the seventh riskiest activity by the League of Women Voters, and
is ranked twelfth riskiest of the listed activities by aviation experts.
Risk in General Aviation
Accident analyses indicates that “during the four years 1989–1992,
1226 instructional airplanes were involved in 1218 crashes included in the
National Transportation Safety Board files. The casualties included 250
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deaths, 128 serious injuries, and 270 minor injuries” (Baker, Lamb, Li, and
Dodd, 1996, p. ix). For the six years 1991–1996 the Nall report (1997, p. 3)
reports a total of 10,811 U.S. General Aviation accidents. These included
1,906 fatal accidents with 4,065 fatalities. Aviation is a high-risk activity.
The Nall Report (1997) states that just because there are risks in an
activity it does not mean that harm is inevitable. The Nall report also states,
however, that pilots cannot afford to ignore the risks involved in aviation
simply because they are inherent in the activity. The goal is to “gain
knowledge about the risks and take proactive steps to control them” (Nall
Report, 1997, p. 2). The first step is acknowledging the risk in aviation and
then enhancing decision-making skills in order to manage them effectively.
This research explored how flight instructors perceive risk in general
aviation.
METHODOLOGY
This paper presents qualitative data collected from private and
instrument flight instructors and students teaching and learning in
collegiate aviation programs. The data presented here are those used in
previous research (Green, 1998) addressing learning through flight
simulation. Dimensional sampling (Arnold, 1970) was used to identify
participants in the study. According to Arnold, dimensional sampling
involves three steps. In the first step, the universe to which you eventually
want to generalize is explicitly delineated. In the second step, what appear
to be the most important dimensions along which the members of this
universe vary and develop are spelled out. A typology is also developed that
includes the various combinations of values of these dimensions. In step
three, this typology is used as a sampling frame for selecting a small
number of cases from the universe.
This type of sampling allows a researcher to avoid limitations that would
be experienced in either a single-case study or a large-number approach to a
topic. This sampling technique seeks to minimize systemic variance and
maximize potential diversity.
Systemic variance in this study was minimized by selecting potential
respondents only from the population of those using flight/aviation training
device (F/ATD’s) as part of a college or university based flight program.
This is one segment of the general aviation community flight training
community. A survey by the University Aviation Association (1991) found
that training devices were in use in this segment of the aviation community.
Diversity was maximized by identifying the following four dimensions
for sampling purposes:
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1. The type of certification F/ATD training was used for: The two types
of certifications addressed in this dimension were
(a) Private Pilot Certification; and
(b) Instrument Pilot Certification.
2. The type of instructor qualifications: Types of instructor certification
addressed were
(a) Certificated Flight Instructors (CFI’s); and
(b) Certificated Instrument Flight Instructors (CFII’s).
3. The type of simulation technology:
(a) Flight training devices; and
(b) Personal Computer-Based Aviation Training Devices
4. The type of higher education institution:
(a) University;
(b) College; and
(c) Community College
The qualitative, exploratory principle of saturation was used to
determine the actual number of interviews and observations (Merriam,
1988). According to the principle of saturation the time to stop collecting
further data from observations or interviews is when additional data is
unlikely to differ from what has already been obtained because the last few
observations or interviews have contributed little or no new information.
Individual interviews of flight instructors and students were conducted
both in person and by telephone. A total of 25 interviews were conducted
with the following types of persons: Certificated Flight Instructors;
Certificated Instrument Flight Instructors; primary flight students; and
instrument flight students. The distribution of field interviews according to
type of institution is presented in Table 1. The distribution of field
interviews according to type of interviewee is shown in Table 2.
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Table 1. Distribution of Field Interviews According to Type of Institution
Type of institution Number of institutions in which Number of interviews
interviewing was conducted
Universities 5 23
Colleges 1 1
Community Colleges 1 1
Total 7 25
Nine of the fifteen instructors interviewed (CFI and CFII) were from the
same university based program. These nine instructors were also observed
giving instruction in a training device. The students who were involved in
these observations were also interviewed. In other words, each student
interviewee was explicitly linked to one of the nine instructors in this sub-
set and was also the subject of observation. In one case, two observations
were performed of one instructor and both students observed were then also
interviewed. This resulted in a total of ten student interviews and
observations. All of the students interviewed had been exposed to the
influences of at least two instructors (ground and flight).
Using instructor interviews and student interviews from one academic
program resulted, through purposive sampling, in the inclusion of
instructors with different experience levels and maximum diversity. Since
the object of the research was not to explore diversity solely within the
tradition of one flight program (Ruesch, 1975, pp. 49-57), other schools
were chosen through systematic selection from a listing of college-based
aviation flight programs (UAA, 1991). The department heads of these
schools then nominated an individual to take part in the research.
RESULTS
In response to an interview question, 73 percent of flight instructors
initially indicated that they do not consider flying a risky activity. When the
question was reframed pointing out specific potential flight hazards, the
percentage indicating that they did not consider flying to be risky declined,
although 33 percent of the instructors still maintained that flying is not a
risky activity.
Do You Consider Flying to Be a Risky Activity?
Interviewees seemed strongly partisan to seeing flying either as safe or
risky. Students and instructor responses both included strong denials that
flying was risky. Overall, the majority of respondents (68 percent)
indicated flying was not risky; that it was safe (Table 3). Among instructors,
73 percent reported that flying was not risky (that it was safe). Included in
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Table 2. Table Distribution of Field Interviews According to Type of Interviewee
Type of interviewees Number of interviews
Instrument instructors (CFII) 12
Primary instructors (CFI) 3
Instrument students 6
Primary students 4
Total 25
this 73 percent figure are 17 percent (2) who stated that risk depended
solely on pilot actions (see Appendix A). Among students, 60 percent
indicated that flying was not risky (see Appendix B).
Engaging in this type of risk denial can result in an instructional design
process that completely bypasses the need to address pitfall management.
Risk denial allows practitioners to view flight as merely the
implementation of technical procedures that, if done correctly, eliminate
the potential for risk and downplay the role of good pilot judgement. This
question turned out to be essential in helping the researcher understand the
interviewee’s frames of reference pertaining to their view of the aviation
environment.
Leaving the interview at this level, however, was not found to be
sufficient. Using the “funnel sequence” (Cannell and Kahn, 1968) helped
interviewees reconsider their way of explaining their view of safety and
risk in aviation. According to Cannell & Kahn (1968): “Within a subject
area, the sequence of questions should be such as to lead the respondent
meaningfully through the process of exploration. Often this can be done by
means of the ‘funnel sequence,’which proceeds from the broadest and most
open of questions to the most specific” (p. 571). The question was reframed
and asked again.
Can Loss of Life or Limb, Litigation, Loss of Reputation, and/or
Expenditure of Large Amounts of Money Result if You Mishandle a
Pitfall or Encounter Untoward Events? If Yes, Please Give an Example
With the reframing of this question 33 percent of the instructors still
insisted flying is not a risky activity (see Appendix C). The majority of
overall respondents (72 percent) did agree that these forms of risk were
possible (Table 4). Among flight instructors there was 67 percent
agreement and among students (see Appendix D) there was 80 percent
agreement that these risks could occur. The flight instructors and students
who initially indicated that they considered flying risky were included in
the “Yes” category of this answer.
Pitfalls that were identified by interviewees included engine problems,
wind shear, mechanical problems, and pilot error such as mistuning
navigation radios and misreading altimeters. One instructor mentioned the
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Table 3. Summary of Responses: Do You Consider Flying to Be a Risky Activity?
Risky Safe Total
Instructors 4 (27%) 11 (73%) 15
Students 4 (40%) 6 (60%) 10
Total 8 (32%) 17 (68%) 25
American Airlines accident in Cali, Colombia as an example of a risk
resulting from mistuning a navigation radio and related a similar error
made by his student.
There is defensiveness to the responses of those who exhibit radical
denial of risk, almost protective of aviation, refuting the traditional view of
aviation as a daredevil activity. One person said that aviation only appeared
risky to people outside the profession. While aviation may not be a
“daredevil” activity, it is not realistic to deny all risk.
DISCUSSION
Whether instructors recognize risk in aviation cannot be overestimated
when considering the type of learning that is appropriate for an activity.
According to Bandura (1986) any type of learning: autonomous; guided
inquiry; reception (all described by Ausabel, Novak, and Hanesian, 1978);
or social-cognitive (Bandura, 1986) is appropriate for low risk endeavors.
When an activity is safe there are no adverse consequences to
implementing any type of learning.
If aviation is viewed as primarily a high-risk activity (the potential exists
for loss of life or limb, litigation, loss of reputation, and/or expenditures of
large amounts of money if a pitfall is mishandled) then instructors need to
operate with the understanding that any form of trial-and-error learning is
contra-indicated because of the potentially catastrophic consequences.
Bandura (1986) states that
one does not teach children to swim, adolescents to drive automobiles, and
novice medical students to perform surgery by having them discover the
requisite behavior from the consequences of their successes and failures. The
more costly and hazardous the possible mistakes, the heavier must be the
reliance on observational learning from competent exemplars…. (p. 20)
Bandura characterizes risk as a condition that precludes the use of
autonomous learning or guided inquiry, both of which have a self-directed
component. A method of learning which allows socialization to the “gold
standards” of the field (acceptable routines that have been constructed and
consensually validated by a profession to handle specific types of
situations) is appropriate under these conditions.
Green 105
Table 4. Summary of Responses: Can Loss of Life or Limb, Litigation, Loss of
Reputation, and/or Expenditure of Large Amounts of Money Result if You Mishandle
a Pitfall or Encounter Untoward Events? If Yes, Please Give an Example
Yes No Total
Instructors 10 (67%) 5 (33%) 15
Students 8 (80%) 2 (20%) 10
Totals 18 (72%) 7 (28%) 25
Cognitive apprenticeship was developed by Collins, Brown, & Newman
(1989). It is a form of social-cognitive learning which has as been
operationalized for use in socializing learners to proficient practice in high-
risk professions (Brandt, Farmer, & Buckmaster, 1993; Farmer,
Buckmaster & LeGrand, 1992). Cognitive apprenticeship starts with a type
of situation and models an acceptable way of performing that has been
constructed and consensually validated by the field. The purpose is to
socialize learners to a cadre of people in the same occupation and to have
them proficiently deal with types of problems using procedures that are
accepted by a particular field of practice. Table 5 outlines the five phases of
cognitive apprenticeship. Integral to cognitive apprenticeship is the explicit
inclusion of validated risk management processes
IMPLICATIONS
The challenge before us is to increase aviation safety through the
improvement of pilot judgement and decision-making. It is recognized that
even highly experienced and well trained commercial flight crews
sometimes make decisions when dealing with unplanned events that in
retrospect are nearly inexplicable. The accident analysis for AA Flight 965
near Cali Columbia (Aeronautical Civil of the Republic of Columbia,
1996) is a case in point. This accident was a controlled flight into terrain
caused primarily by a change of course, based on guidance from a mistuned
radio, that was made without first verifying the effect on flight path. The
accident report states in part that “although the accident flight crew
articulated misgivings several times during the approach, neither pilot
displayed the objectivity necessary to recognize that they had lost situation
awareness,” the descent was not discontinued, and a climb was not initiated
in time to avoid terrain. The analysis notes that one explanation of the
crew’s actions is that “the guidance given in the in the airline reference
guide and in training did not have sufficient impact to be recalled in times
of high stress and workload,” and that the crew “did not recognize the
hazards the airline had warned them about” (pp. 36–37).
This research demonstrates that pilot attitude toward risk and risk
management strategies are established quite early in flight training. The
first step to risk management is the recognition of risk. Fully a third of the
flight instructors interviewed did not recognize the risk inherent in aviation,
assuming competence in routine procedures will suffice in achieving an
accident-free career. The emphasis on criterion-referenced performance
standards i.e., maintenance of +/-100 feet in maneuvers, in the FAA
Practical Test Standards may contribute to this view. The pilots of AA 965,
in terms of “bounded flexibility,” displayed an optimistic estimate of their
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ability to complete the approach, downplayed the areas where control
would be difficult, and overestimated the likelihood of their influence being
successful.
This research also suggests that pilot decision-making can be facilitated
through the use of an appropriate type of learning that incorporates the
modeling of consensually validated cognitive procedures and risk
management processes. Not just content, but how that content is taught in
the early stages of pilot training, can have important implications for the
development of risk management strategies in pilots. The accident analysis
of AA 965 states that the pilots were not able to apply what they had learned
simply from reading or hearing about the approach conditions. The
robustness of cognitive apprenticeship for aviation instruction is validated
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Table 5. Phases of Cognitive Apprenticeship
Phase Role of Learner Role of Model Key Concepts
Phase I Observes performance of
activity, not merely the
subskills. Develops
mental model or schema
of what the real thing
looks like.
Models an acceptable
procedure. Model states
aloud: principles
underlying the procedure;
tricks that make it work;
and identifies pitfalls
likely to be incurred and
how to handle them.
Articulation
Domain specific
heuristics
Situated knowledge
Schema
Phase II Approximate doing the
real thing and articulate
its essence. Reflect on
the model's performance.
Use self-monitoring and
self-correction
Provide coaching to the
learner. Provide support
when needed.
Scaffolding
Coaching
Phase III Continue to approximate
the real thing. Work
individually or in groups.
Decrease scaffolding and
coaching
Fading
Phase IV Practice doing the real
thing on his/her own. Do
so within specified limits
acceptable to profession
and society.
Provide assistance only
when requested.
Self-directed learning
Phase V Discuss the
generalizability of what
has been learned
Explain the
generalizability of what
has been learned and
provides an advance
organizer.
Generalizability
Note: By J.A. Farmer, 1996. Adapted with permission of the author.
in that it either includes or addresses all seven important training factors
identified by Wickens (1992). These factors are: (a) practice and
overlearning; (b) elaborative rehearsal; (c) reducing concurrent task load;
(4) error prevention; (5) adaptive training; (6) part-task training; and (7)
knowledge of results.
In training competent pilots we must teach not only for the
overwhelming majority of flight time that is routine but also for those
instances that distinguish aviation as a high-risk endeavor. The learner must
be able to do routines but also handle problems in ways that work for the
individual pilot and are appropriate under the circumstances while being in
compliance with the regulations, rules, procedures, and principles of
aviation. The training to achieve this, which will impact pilots throughout
their careers, needs to be incorporated in the early stages of flight training.
If and how we adapt our educational practices to enhance pilot decision-
making will have important implications for aviation safety in the future.
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APPENDIX A
Instructor Responses: Do You Consider Flying to Be a Risky Activity?
“I don’t consider flying risky if you know what you are doing.”
“I don’t feel every day I go up and take my life in my hands.”
“I don’t consider it any riskier than any other activity. I risk my life when I
wake up and get out of bed.”
“No, not at all risky.”
“I don’t consider flying to be adversely risky. If you are riding a bike there
is risk”
“I don’t think flying is risky.”
“I never feel like flying is risky.”
“It is no riskier than boating.”
“I don’t feel like it is risky, but I am so used to it I might as well be getting in
my car.”
“I guess it depends. If I were to do something stupid like fly in icing
conditions it would be risky. Most of the time I feel I am in control of the
situation, whether I am flying by myself or with a student.”
“Yes, I do consider flying risky, but I also deliver pizzas and I find that
driving to have the same risk level.”
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APPENDIX B
Student Responses: Do You Consider Flying to Be a Risky Activity?
“I think flying is very safe.”
“I consider driving a car more risky than flying.”
“There is less risk than most activities.”
“There is not too much risk.”
“No I do not consider it risky.”
“No (it’s not risky) because technology has advanced. The main concern of
everyone while flying is having an engine failure. And the technology that
new engines use today is so far advanced that engine failures are very rare.
Almost every other risk you can prevent yourself.”
“I do consider it risky but no more so than driving.”
“I’m not sure it’s risky but it is scary.”
“From what I have heard, it is risky.”
“In a way I think it is. It’s riskier than many other occupations but it is also
risky being a police officer. (In aviation) not only is your life in danger, but
you are putting in so much money and if you fail a class there are additional
costs. So you have to take it more seriously. We really have a lot of
responsibility. In that respect, I think it is a pretty dangerous occupation,
but if you have developed a how-to-be-responsible attitude you can avoid a
lot of the hazards.”
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APPENDIX C
Instructor Responses: Can Loss of Life or Limb, Litigation, Loss of
Reputation, and/or Expenditure of Large Amounts of Money Result if
You Mishandle a Pitfall or Encounter Untoward Events?
“I don’t agree with that statement.”
“(This definition) doesn’t change my answer. I don’t find aviation risky. If
you’re riding a bicycle there’s always a potential for catastrophe.”
“No, bad luck is created by people and if you have competent people that
lessens the potential risk factor.”
“My answer stays the same, no, aviation is not risky.”
“No, mechanical problems and engine failures could be risky, but if you
know how to take care of (them) I don’t consider them very risky.”
“I have enough confidence in myself and my students (to prevent) risks.”
“If you are looking at one mistake and there goes my ticket then I would
definitely consider it higher risk.”
“The potential is always there.”
“I think so. I agree with that.”
“Most certainly.”
APPENDIX D
Student Responses: Can Loss of Life or Limb, Litigation, Loss of
Reputation, and/or Expenditure of Large Amounts of Money Result if
You Mishandle a Pitfall or Encounter Untoward Events?
“I think most of the risk comes at the point where the accident chain is
advancing and the pilot doesn’t realize it, something goes wrong, and the
risk all of a sudden just explodes.”
“Considering that most flights are very safe, there are few that crash, it
really doesn’t change my mind (aviation is safe). Only a very small
percentage have problems.”
“It has more risk than other things you could be doing but there’s a lot of
things that are more risky, like being a police officer. So I think the chances
are better that those things aren’t going to happen.”
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BOOK REVIEW
Millbrooke, A.M. (1999). Aviation History. Englewood, CO: Jeppensen
Sanderson. Pp. 612. ISBN 0-88487-235-1. $68.00, hardcover.
Reviewed by Nanette M. Scarpellini, Omaha, Nebraska
Aviation History delivers an entertaining account and perspective on
international aviation history. This book is an excellent resource to
students, educators, and aviation enthusiasts. In reviewing this book, the
principal criteria included content, organization, and reference sources.
While editing errors and organizational incongruities plague some of the
latter chapters, many of the shortcomings of this first edition will likely be
alleviated by later editions. These problems are only a minor distraction to
the story being told.
Starting with the first unmanned hot air balloon flight in 1783 through
the announcement of the X Prize that will be awarded to the first non-
government sponsored manned spacecraft, the author shows the detailed
progression of international aviation and aerospace technology. The reader
is taken on a journey through the world of aviation and receives first-hand
accounts from the inventors and dreamers who made it possible. The tone
of the book reflects a learned appreciation for the marvel of aviation as
illustrated by a quote from the 1759 aviation-related novel Rasselas, by
Samuel Johnson which explains flight in this fashion: “So fishes have
water, in which yet beasts can swim by nature, and men by art. He that can
swim needs not despair to fly: to swim is to fly in a grosser fluid, and to fly
is to swim in a subtler” (2-5).
The author, Anne Marie Millbrooke, is a proven historian and author
specializing in science and technology with an emphasis on aviation
history. In addition to acting as a historian for such organizations as the
National Park Service, National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
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she has also managed the Archive and Historical Center at United
Technologies Corporation and been a Research Collaborator with the
National Air and Space Museum. Her educational accomplishments
include earning her doctoral degree from the University of Pennsylvania as
well as her pilot certificate. Millbrooke's multi-faceted background
establishes her in a strategic position to gather and assemble key pieces of
aviation history that span the globe.
The organization of Aviation History allows the reader to easily follow
the evolution of aviation. The book is divided into ten chapters. Opening
with early aviation of the 18th century, the book progresses through the
Wright Brothers, early flight, World War I, peacetime aviation, the Golden
Age of Charles Lindbergh and aviation firsts, World War II, the Cold War,
space age aviation, and finally modern aerospace through 1999 with
glimpses of the 21st century and beyond. The appendices conclude with a
listing of aviation firsts and space flights, as well as a copy of the Wright
U.S. Patent. While it is impossible to explore thoroughly all topics, the
detailed bibliography provides sources for obtaining more information.
The construction of the book lends itself well to a study of different time
periods in history. Each chapter is broken down into four sections, which
typically fit logically into the topic of the chapter. All chapters are
composed of the following defining parts. The Summary of Events for the
time period under review leads into the introduction and the chapter goals.
Within the text of the chapter, are an assortment of breakout boxes that
either describe an historic event, provide historical evidence to support
aviation theories, or relate bibliographical information about individuals
who were propitious in shaping aviation history. Unfortunately, the stories
that intrigue can also confuse a reader when they are so numerous as to
distort the flow of the text. The chapter is completed by a thorough
bibliography, study questions reviewing the material covered, and a
timeline augmented by providing events not directly associated with
aviation. The book is well-referenced making skillful use of first-person
sources.
The orderliness of the book conforms to an academic curriculum. While
the chapters create neatly parceled packages, certain areas seem forced to
conform to the ten-chapter plan. For instance, Chapter 9: Space Age
Aviation feels oddly burdened by the last third of the chapter which focuses
on fighter aircraft and various wars from Vietnam to the U.S. invasion of
Granada as well as a final section completely on private and general
aviation. These subjects can be better covered by creating another chapter
or by parceling them into both earlier and later sections. Overall, a detailed
story of the advancement of aviation is shown in readable and entertaining
style.
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Millbrooke presents a broad analysis of aviation history that focuses on
developments worldwide as opposed to the many history books that single
out achievements of the United States. Aviation History offers an objective
view of aviation developments and illustrates the interactive nature of the
industry. War spurred many of aviation's most significant advances with
countries openly borrowing new procedures and operations from enemy
progress in the field to create the most effective fighting fleet.
“Nationalistic pride in aviation went beyond the romance and fads of
aviation, to national identity and claims of distinctiveness and
superiority…Legends grew around the British S.E. (scout experimental
made by the Royal Aircraft Factory), the French Spad, and the German
Fokker” (4-4).
Each chapter is filled with pictures and colorful quotes from people of
that era. These firsthand accounts provide deeper insight into what, in some
history books, is just a listing of factual information. When the “Red
Baron” Manfred von Richthofen describes his victory over British ace
Lanoe Hawker on November 23, 1916, the day comes alive. “I was on
patrol that day and observed three Englishmen who had nothing else in
mind than to hunt. I noticed how they ogled me, and since I felt ready for
battle, I let them come…” (in Richthofen's The Red Baron, 4-29).
The author supplies an in-depth analysis of various aspects of aviation
often glossed over in aviation books. Some of the areas explored include
the development of aerial photography, air-to-ground communication with
early wireless radio equipment, and airmail expansion beyond the United
States. Antoine de Saint-Exupery flew a la Ligne mail route between
France and Spain that sometimes crossed hostile territory. A flight on
February 1927 he recounts in the following fashion in a letter to his mother.
“The trip went well, aside from a breakdown and the plane crashing into the
desert” (Schiff. 1994 in 5-41). As evidenced by the stories recounted
throughout the volume, early pilots were part mechanic, part inventor and
part adventurer in order to survive.
Aviation History is a collection of significant events in aviation accented
by the people who made it happen and correlated with world affairs. The
book's use of color and vivid stories helps to make the advancements come
to life as something more than significant events on a timeline. While at
times the stories may clutter the page, they also breathe life into what is
considered by many to be a dull subject. The author's enthusiasm for the
topic is obvious throughout. More thorough proofreading could help
alleviate some of the confusion that is caused by typos and a few mislabeled
illustrations. The credibility of the content does not suffer due to these
obvious errors which will likely be corrected in the next edition.
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